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INTRODUCTION
Among the principles essential for orderly adjudication is
the ability of parties to litigation to rely on the finality of judg-
ments. A dispute resolution mechanism that does not provide
for a high degree of finality would have little practical utility,
either to the parties or to society. As important as finality, how-
ever, is the basic notion that due process protects those who
were not participants or in privity with participants in prior liti-
gation from being bound by any judgment entered. The rights of
nonparties who did not have their day in court should not be
prejudiced.1
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. BA., Goucber College,
1966; J.D., St John's University School of Law, 1976. The authors wish to thank Elise
Pastore Rossbach, Esq., and Catherine Alfandre, Seton Hall class of 1993, Laura
Sinonyan and Angela D. Thomas, Seton Hall class of 1994.
** Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. BA., Siena College, 1965;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1968; LL.M,, New York University School of Law, 1972.
' There is a strong societal interest in finality insofar as public resources are ex-
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These two principles-the finality of judgments and the
nonbinding nature of judgments on nonparties-came into sharp
conflict in the 1989 Supreme Court decision of Martin v. Wilks.
2
The Court basically subordinated the finality of judgments to
the rights of nonparties by holding that failure to intervene in
the original suit did not affect the right of nonparties to chal-
lenge in another action the changes mandated by the prior de-
cree. While the Court indicated that both sets of concerns could
be accommodated by aggressive use of Rule 19 joinder by the
original parties,3 many commentators expressed doubt about the
practicality of the Court's suggestion.4
pended in the resolution of disputes. This societal interest in finality is paralleled by the
interests of at least some of the parties to the dispute; but fairness to outsiders requires
limiting the effects of any resolution to those who participated in the proceeding.
2 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The problem raised in Martin has been discussed in a number
of law review articles, mostly focusing on the effect of consent decrees on the rights of
nonparties. See Charles J. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of
Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 155;
Richard A. Epstein, Wilder v. Bernstein: Squeeze Play by Consent Decree, 1987 U. Ctii,
LEGAL F. 209; Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Micti.
L. REV. 321 (1988); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of
Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 103; Thomas M. Mengler, Consent
Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REv. 291 (1988); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fair-
ness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 897; Mark E. Rectenwald, Com-
ment, Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. Cl. L.
REV. 147 (1986).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a):
Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the per-
son's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as
a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order
that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that
party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dis-
missed from the action.
There will be difficulties identifying parties to be joined, and when they are identi-
fied, heavy costs of service as well as complications in case management will result. See,
e.g., George M. Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (1990). Focusing on the
case before the Court, Professor Strickler wrote that, although the employer in Martin
was not extremely large, the number of
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These doubts found official expression in the Civil Rights
Act of 19911 in which Congress attempted to strike a substan-
tially different balance between finality of judgments and the
rights of nonparties.' Essentially, the Act provides that nonpar-
ties are barred from attacking employment practices mandated
by a prior order when (1) they were either adequately repre-
sented by a party to the proceeding or when (2) they had actual
notice of the threat to their interest and an opportunity to pro-
tect themselves. This Article considers both Martin v. Wilks
and the changes wrought by the new Civil Rights Act.
By way of preface, it is important to note that Martin, al-
though decided in the context of a consent decree resolving an
employment discrimination suit, is not limited to such actions.
white incumbent employees potentially affected by the affirmative relief at is-
sue ... was well over 1100.... The cost of personal service of the complaint
alone in such a case would discourage all but the wealthiest of litigants. The
expense and administrative difficulty of such a case would, of course, only be-
gin with service of the complaint.
Id. at 1593-94. Other commentators stressed the difficulties of even identifying parties to
be joined in many cases. See, e.g., Matthew J. Fairless, Martin v. Wills: Playing by the
Rules in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 55 Mo. L. Rcv. 703 (1990).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
6 HR REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 53 (1991) (it would be "extremely
impracticable" and "prohibitively expensive" to require the named parties to join every
potentially interested person). The report cites with approval Professor Larry Kramer's
view on joinder.
Opponents of [section 108 of the new Civil Rights Act] do not argue that it is
undesirable to settle third party claims contemporaneously with the original
lawsuit. They argue that... the parties to the original lawsuit... should
bear the burden of identifying affected third parties and joining them....
But are [these parties] really in the best position to judge who should be
joined? After all, who knows better than the affected [third] parties themselves
whether a proposed consent decree affects them in ways they deem important
enough to litigate about?
Id. at 54.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stressed the difficulties fac-
ing the Martin parties in identifying parties to be joined. See S. REP No. 315, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1991):
Thus, if the city of Birmingham and the original black plaintiffs wanted to
obtain a court decree finally determining how the fire department would make
hiring and promotion decisions, they must join as parties to the litigation not
only every person currently employed by the department, but also etery per-
son who might seek to be hired or promoted by the department during the
pendency of the decree.
In the Committee's view, the decision on whether to participate in ongoing litigation
should be left to the nonparty.
' Pub L. No. 102-166, Sec. 108, § 703(n)(1)(B)(i)&(ii), 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (1991).
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Theoretically, Martin establishes principles governing all federal
judgments,8 whether fully litigated or a product of settlement.9
8 Martin v. Wilks dealt with successive federal claims in federal court. The princi-
ples of preclusion applicable were those of federal common law. But what law governs
when the first litigation is in a state court and the second in a federal court, or vice
versa? Further, does it matter if the earlier decision is rendered on the basis of state or
federal law?
The answer is clearest where the prior suit is in state court, regardless of what law
the state court applies. Federal courts are directed to accord previously rendered state
judgments the same preclusive effect the rendering state would as long as consistent with
the Due Process Clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988). This rule applies to state judgments
resolving federal claims as well as those resolving state claims. See Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1982); Andrea Catania, Access to the Federal Courts for
Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer Era: Keeping the Doors Open, 16 Loy. U. CHI
L.J. 209 (1985). While a congressional remedial scheme may modify this general rule and
thereby allow relitigation of a claim or issue that would not be permitted under state
preclusion rules, any intent to give state judgments less preclusive effect than section
1738 mandates must be clearly shown. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111
S. Ct. 2166 (1991); University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
Whether federal courts can give state judgments greater preclusive effect than the
rendering state is doubtful. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 cmt. g (1982)
(In general, section 1738 requires federal courts to give "the same" preclusive effect as
under the law of the rendering state.) It has been argued, however, that, since preclusion
governs the decision-making process, the federal courts should be able to give greater
preclusive effect to state judgments as a matter of federal law. See generally Ronan E.
Degnan,,Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976); Allan D. Vestal, Res Judi-
cata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1723 (1968). But see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373 (1985); 1B JAMES W. MOORE, ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.406[11, at 270
nn.16 & 18 (2d ed. 1992).
Suppose, however, the prior litigation is in federal court. Such a situation could arise
where the federal court was exercising either diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
While there is obviously a greater interest in protecting judgments on federal question
grounds, Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach [Part I of I], 71 CORNELL L. R v. 733
(1986), federal preclusion principles should apply to federal judgments even where the
federal court was exercising diversity jurisdiction. See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort
Worth Airport, 861 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 87 (1982); 1B MOORE ET. AL, supra, 0.40611], at 272. But see Answering Serv. Inc. v.
Egan, 728 F.2d 1500, 1505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Costantini v. TWA, 681 F.2d 1199 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982) (applying preclusion rules of the forum state in a
diversity action).
The application of federal preclusion principles, regardless of the jurisdictional basis
of the underlying claim, reflects the notion that to maintain the integrity of its judicial
process each system should determine the scope of its judgment. In some instances,
though, preclusion principles touch on substantive policy concerns, such as when persons
should be considered in privity. Arguably, state law, not federal law, should apply in
determining whether privity applies to a federal judgment resolving a state claim. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. b (1982).
" As a practical matter, however, the Martin problem is likely to arise most often in
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Further, while the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly specifies dif-
ferent principles applicable to employment discrimination cases,
the effectiveness of the Act even in this limited sphere is ques-
tionable.10 Instead of barring all subsequent challenges to court
ordered remedial schemes, Congress barred only narrowly de-
fined classes of persons from challenging decreed employment
practices. Moreover, it offered no clear road map as to how the
parties should proceed under the statute to insulate the employ-
ment practice from attack. As a result, Congress may not have
achieved the finality it sought.
This Article proceeds, first, by relating the controversy that
led to the Martin opinion; second, by examining the problems
generated by that opinion and how the opinion should be inter-
preted; and, third, by considering the effectiveness of the recent
congressional action addressing these problems in one con-
text-employment discrimination. While there has been much
discussion concerning the significance of the changes worked by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,11 few have observed that the new
what has been called "public law" or "institutional reform" litigation. See generally Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CoimrL L.
REV. 270 (1989). Professor Tobias describes such reform litigation as having
"sprawling and amorphous" party structure. Plaintiffs typically pursue relief
that could affect numerous people not before the court as well as institutional,
political, and economic structures. Individuals frequently attempt to litigate
their cases as class actions.... Defendants generally are large bureaucratic
institutions or agencies of the federal, state, or local government, such as pris-
ons or schools. The subject matter of these lawsuits usually is the policy, prac-
tice, operation, or decisionmaking of those entities-in essence, a dispute over
the conduct or content of public policy .... Plaintiffs often seek non-mone-
tary, "prospective injunctive relief to prevent continued wrongdoing .... .
These remedies frequently affect many persons and entities not involved in the
suit, require ongoing judicial participation, and are meant to reform the of-
fending institution.
Id. at 280-81. See also OwEN M. Fiss. THE CIV. RIcHS INJUNcriON (1978); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAnv. L. Rm. 1281 (1976);
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 4 (1982); Richard Fallon, Of Justiciability, Reme-
dies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 1 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE U. 1073 (1984);
Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAw & Hum
BEHAV. 121 (1982); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE W. 635 (1982).
10 See text accompanying notes 111-62 infra.
" Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading
Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAD. L. Ray. 595 (1991) (discussing
both the vetoed 1990 bill and the proposed 1991 bill); Niall A. Paul, The Civil Rights Act
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statute leaves Martin entirely intact outside the employment
area. The courts, therefore, will have to continue to struggle with
the meaning of that decision. This Article argues that in such
cases, or when the immunity requirements of the new statute are
not satisfied, courts can still reach sensible results by properly
construing Martin v. Wilks. They can do so by preserving prior
decrees from attack while ensuring that nonparties who are af-
fected by such decrees have a cause of action for damages. The
authors' reading of Martin would maximize finality and still pro-
tect the rights of nonparties who failed to intervene in the prior
proceeding.
I. SHAPING THE CONTROVERSY
Since the early days of Title VII discrimination suits, the
courts have been vexed by the effect of decrees on nonparties.
Perhaps the most visible, though not the only, problem was
posed when black plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief, either af-
ter litigation or by virtue of a consent decree, requiring the em-
ployer to prefer blacks to whites in hiring or promotion." The
of 1991: What Does It Really Accomplish?, 17 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 567 (1992); Am-
biguities in Civil Rights Law Still Must Be Resolved by Courts, Daily Labor Rep. No.
238 C-1 (Dec. 11, 1991).
'2 In the early days of Title VII, the focus tended to be on whether a decree might
somehow limit the rights of other potential victims of discrimination. For example,
would a successful government suit prevent private black plaintiffs from obtaining fur-
ther or inconsistent relief? See generally Michael J. Zimmer & Charles A. Sullivan, Con-
seit Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment
Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DuKE L.J. 163. See also
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. ZIMMER & RICHARD F. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM.
INATION, chs. 30 & 35 (1988). Alternatively, restructuring employment practices to resolve
a claim of race discrimination could raise questions about the significance of the prior
decree when female plaintiffs brought sex discrimination suits.
Courts have shown concern for other potential victims of discrimination in fashion-
ing relief for prevailing plaintiffs. In Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 717 F.2d 1140
(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984), the court denied immediate reinstate-
ment to class members who had been discharged on the basis of their sex, in part basing
its decision on the impact on minority flight attendants:
Pursuant to a consent decree entered in 1976, United has hired an increasing
number of flight attendants who are members of minority groups in recent
years. Accordingly, these persons have relatively low seniority. They would,
therefore, be more affected as a group by the immediate reinstatement of the
class than the other incumbent flight attendants. Evidence in the record sug-
gests that immediate rehiring of all class members would decrease the percent-
age of minority flight attendants from fifteen to ten percent. Further, because
of the many furloughs that would result from implementation of this remedy,
[Vol. 57:9951000
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whites who were adversely affected by the resulting preferences
would then sue the employer, claiming reverse discrimination.
Obviously, there is an important substantive issue of the ex-
tent to which "affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination" is
permitted by Title VII or the Constitution." But hidden behind
this issue is a procedural one: to what extent, if at all, could the
employer shelter its practices behind the decree ordering it to
engage in the challenged conduct? Further, does it matter
whether the decree in question is one entered by consent or after
vigorous litigation?
To appreciate the problem, consider a case in which a single
black plaintiff litigates to judgment a claim of hiring discrimina-
tion, obtaining an order of instatement with seniority back to
the date she originally applied for employment. There is no
doubt that such relief is appropriate, indeed preferred, under
Title VII.1  Further, because the relief is keyed to remedying
discrimination against the actual victim, there is no question
about the constitutionality of such an order. Indeed, it is hard to
describe such relief as a racial preference at all. Nevertheless,
the effect of granting the black plaintiff seniority is to disadvan-
tage all employees (white and black) who are moved down one
rung on the seniority ladder.15 Could one or more of these indi-
there would be less or no hiring by United in the next several years and the
number of minority members working as United flight attendants would not be
increased by new hires.
Id. at 1152 (citations omitted).
13 See generally KATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFRmATIVE ACION AND PRINCIPLES OF JUS-
TICE (1989); MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JusTCn A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITIONAL INQUIRY (1991); SutavAN, ZmnsE & RICHARDs. supra note 12, §§ 3.7.1 &
3.7.2; G. Sidney Buchanan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County. A
Paradigm of Affirmative Action, 26 Hous. L RV. 229 (1989); Samuel Issacharoff, When
Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents
in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CONEL L Rv. 189 (1992); George Rutherglen &
Daniel 1& Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confu-
sion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REv. 467 (1988); Joel L. Selig, Affirmative Action in
Employment After Croson and Martin: The Legacy Remains Intact, 63 TEMP. LQ. 1
(1990); Marshall J. Walthew, Affirmative Action and the Remedial Scope of Title VII:
Procedural Answers to Substantive Questions, 136 U. PA. L Rv. 625 (1987).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70 (1976).
15 It is true that courts often order remedies amounting to "jump" not "bump," that
is, requiring the first opening to be given to the plaintiff, not ordering her to displace the
incumbent. See generally Dale Carpenter, Bumping the Status Quo: Actual Relief for
Actual Victims of Discrimination, 58 U. CHL L REv. 703 (1991). This, however, merely
blunts the effect of the court order on nonparties; it in no way eliminates it.
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viduals (or their union, acting on their behalf) sue the employer
for any resulting harm?
For a number of years before Martin, the circuit courts
overwhelmingly held that the entry of a decree precluded any
collateral attack on the decree.16 Under this approach, to chal-
lenge the employer's actions implementing the decree, an oppo-
nent had to intervene in the suit in which the decree was en-
tered rather than commence a separate suit. In short, the rule
against "collateral attacks"17  created a judicially imposed
"mandatory intervention" rule18 as the only means to attack re-
medial employment schemes.
Although mandatory intervention may appear a rather in-
nocuous procedural mechanism to join all claims in a single pro-
ceeding, this requirement often was outcome-determinative.
While some courts adopting the requirement of mandatory in-
tervention in fact seemed to favor intervention, others were
more hostile, frequently finding that the petition to intervene
was untimely.19 Where intervention was untimely, the effect of
barring collateral attack was to immunize the practices ordered.
The effect of this was heightened because the notion of collat-
eral attack was itself broad: any challenge to those practices that
were implemented to comply with the order were barred. As we
will see, it is often possible both to comply literally with the de-
cree and to compensate third parties injured by such compli-
ance. Nevertheless, the broadest definitions of the rule required
1 See, e.g., Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally di-
vided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983).
17 The term "collateral attack" is a misnomer since the plaintiff in the second action
is not attacking the validity of the prior judgment; rather, she is challenging the legality
of an employment practice implemented by virtue of the order or judgment. The under-
lying court order may still be binding on the parties to the first suit.
1" The doctrine of mandatory intervention is somewhat misnamed, like tho "duty"
to mitigate in contract law. There is no requirement that anyone intervene, but the doc-
trine would treat failure to do so by a nonparty with notice as a bar to an otherwise valid
claim. See generally Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79
COLUM L. REV. 1551 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980); Hefner v. New Orle-
ans Pub. Serv., Inc., 605 F.2d 893, 897 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955
(1980) (whether viewed as a motion to intervene after judgment, an independent action
seeking relief from the judgment, or an independent action seeking relief inconsistent
with the judgment, laches bars suit when there has been a two-year unexcused delay
from entry of the consent decree).
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intervention to raise any challenge. Further, although some deci-
sions permitted separate suits that did not directly conflict with
a decree's provisions, others held that any suit requiring any in-
terpretation of the decree constituted A collateral attack because
the common party (typically, the employer) might be bound by
inconsistent decisions.2
In any event, the requirement of mandatory intervention
was definitively rejected by the Supreme Court in Martin v.
Wilks.21 The case arose from consent decrees resolving chal-
lenges to hiring and promotion discrimination against blacks by
the city of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel
Board. After a bench trial, but before decision, proposed consent
decrees were agreed to by the parties. The district court ap-
proved them provisionally but gave notice to the community
that it would hold a hearing on the fairness of the decrees.2 2 At
that hearing, the Birmingham Firefighters Association objected
as amicus curiae. Even before the fairness decision, the Associa-
tion and two of its white members sought to make their status
more formal by petitioning to intervene. Although they asserted
that the decrees would adversely affect their rights, the district
court denied their intervention motions as untimely and entered
the decrees. The denial was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit,
which reasoned that the would-be intervenors could challenge
any adverse results in a direct Title VII suit.
2
3
With the first promotion of a black firefighter in 1982, a dif-
ferent group of white firefighters brought suit against the city
and the board, claiming that they were being denied promotions
on racial grounds in violation of Title VII. While the white
plaintiffs in essence accepted the Eleventh Circuit's invitation to
bring a direct Title VII suit, the district court ultimately dis-
missed their action, holding that any promotions "mandated" by
the consent decrees could not constitute a violation of Title
20 See, e.g., Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 66.
21 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
2 Notice of the proposed order consisted of advertisements in local papers stating
that "Consent Decrees... designed to correct for the effects of any alleged past discrimi-
nation and to insure equal employment opportunities for all applicants and employees"
were to be entered. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 227 n.192.
United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518 (lth Cir. 1983). That
decision also affirmed the district court's denial of a Title VII injunction because there
was no showing of irreparable harm.
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VII.24 In short, the district court was willing to inquire into the
employers' restructuring practices to see whether they were
within the decrees, but once the court found that the practices
were mandated by the decrees it found them automatically shel-
tered from collateral attack. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,'
viewing this approach as essentially denying what its earlier de-
cision had promised.25
At the Supreme Court, a majority affirmed. Five Justices
joined in a comparatively short opinion authored by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist who viewed the issue as one of basic preclusion
law. Under traditional principles, those who were not parties,
nor in privity with parties, could not be bound by a judgment.2
Thus, the white employees were free to attack conduct that, but
for the decree, would be a violation of Title VII. That challenge
may be mounted in a separate suit in which the decree itself
offers no protection to the employer. Presumably, however, in
this second suit the employer can justify the decree's terms as
proper under Title VII.
While the Court recognized certain exceptions to this limi-
tation on the effect of judgments-class actions and "a special
remedial scheme foreclosing nonlitigants, as for example in
bankruptcy and probate"-the present case did not fit within
them, and the majority was unwilling to fashion a separate rule
for discrimination proceedings.27
As for barring plaintiffs from suit because of their failure to
intervene, the Court recognized that the white firefighters had
notice of the earlier litigation and its potential effect on their
24 490 U.S. at 760.
25 490 U.S. at 761; In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Litig., 833 F.2d 1492
(11th Cir. 1988).
26 The significance of this statement depends in large part on the scope of the con-
cept of "privies" and the extent to which the earlier litigation would be held to be bind-
ing in any event. In Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 824 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1987),
for example, the court of appeals approved of preclusion by a prior determination that
Detroit had intentionally discriminated against blacks in police hiring. Although the
prior suit had involved white sergeants, the court found it proper to preclude relitigation
by white patrolmen of that issue given the "strong community of interest" between the
two classes and the substantial overlap in class membership. However, the court found
that the prior litigation had not decided the question of the appropriate remedy-quota
or otherwise-for the discrimination found; accordingly, plaintiffs in the second suit were
free to litigate that issue. See also NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 821 F.2d 328
(6th Cir. 1987).
2' 490 U.S. at 762 n.2.
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interests. Nevertheless, the Court observed that Rule 24(a) of
the Federal Rules simply did not impose any requirement to in-
tervene.28 Absent a rule of mandatory intervention, failure to in-
tervene could not adversely affect nonparties' rights. The Court
(unlike most circuit courts that had faced the issue previously)
was unwilling to engraft any requirement to intervene on the
Rule as written. In short, the Court expressly rejected
"mandatory intervention" as a means of funneling all challenges
into one proceeding. Although it recognized the desirability of
resolving all claims together, the majority believed the better
way to achieve this goal was to place the onus on the original
parties to join affected nonparties under Rule 19,20 rather than
require nonparties to seek intervention under Rule 24(a).30
The Martin majority recognized certain practical problems
with Rule 19 joinder which might suggest that intervention
under Rule 24 was preferable: "Potential adverse claimants may
be numerous and difficult to identify; if they are not joined, the
possibility for inconsistent judgments exists. Judicial resources
will be needlessly consumed in relitigation of the same ques-
tion."31 But the Court believed that accepting these arguments
"would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation of the
relevant Rules." 2 Further, it saw the problem as more substan-
tive than procedural in the context of Title VII suits. "Affirma-
tive action" or "reverse discrimination" is sometimes permissible
and sometimes not, depending on its justifications.3 Therefore,
28 FF,. R. Civ. P. 24(a):
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter im-
pair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the appli-
cants interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
29 FAm. R. Civ. P. 19(a). See note 3 supra. Rule 19 is in many respects simply the flip
side of Rule 24. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
30 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that (assuming timely application) an
individual may intervene as of right when her employment is threatened, regardless of
whether any legal right is altered, provided that the existing parties do not adequately
represent the interests of the would-be intervenor. For example, while an employee-at-
will has no "right" to continued employment, she nevertheless may have an expectation-
in-fact that will justify intervention to protect her against adverse consequences of a
judgment.
11 490 U.S. at 766-67.
3' Id. at 767.
The Supreme Court has upheld affirmative action plans against Title VII claims
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accommoilating the rights of black plaintiffs and their white
competitors would generate difficulties regardless of whether
Rule 19 or Rule 24 was the procedural mechanism used to bring
all interested parties together in one action. Further, the Court
believed that the primary parties-plaintiff and defend-
ant-were the ones best able to assess the possible adverse im-
pact on strangers to the litigation and bring such persons in by
Rule 19 joinder.
3 4
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Title VII
policy favoring voluntary resolution cut against its holding: a
true settlement would resolve the claims of all interested par-
ties. The majority reiterated a point made in an earlier case: a
consent decree does not bind anyone who has not in fact con-
sented, even if he is a party to the litigation.
Martin triggered a strong dissent by Justice Stevens, who
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. The
dissenters, however, did not confine themselves to the question
of mandatory intervention, which could be defended merely as a
device for channeling all related claims into one lawsuit. Rather,
they asserted a greater role for the original decree.
Essentially, the dissent agreed that nonparties could not be
"bound" by a consent decree in a legal sense, but rejected the
majority's notion of what constitutes being bound. For Justice
Stevens, the white firefighters might have their opportunities for
employment affected in a practical sense while not being legally
bound. To avoid these consequences, these persons should inter-
vene. Failing that, and subject to certain narrow exceptions per-
mitting "collateral attack" on court judgments, 6 the judgment
of reverse discrimination in both the racial and gender contexts. See Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979). The Court has been less hospitable to such plans where the attack is predi-
cated on the Constitution. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The
principles governing affirmative action are discussed in SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICIARDS,
supra note 12, § 3.7.
3' 490 U.S. at 765. There is no reason to limit the case to reverse discrimination
suits. Presumably, the holding in Martin also means that other persons claiming discrim-
ination-for example, women claiming sex discrimination in an effort to restructure em-
ployment systems that have been modified in a prior race suit-are not bound by a
judgment.
Id. at 768 (citing Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986)).
" Justice Stevens acknowledged that in certain limited circumstances nonparties
could collaterally attack prior judgments. But none of these permissible grounds existed
in Martin. 490 U.S. at 862. There was no showing that the decree was a product of fraud
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becomes a fact of life with which the nonparty must live. So far,
the dissent may be read as merely defending the innovation of
mandatory intervention. But Justice Stevens goes further to ar-
gue that the employer's motivation to comply with a decree ne-
gates the requisite intent to discriminate necessary for a Title
VII disparate treatment violation.37 Thus, he would presumably
immunize employers from liability, at least until a decree was
properly vacated as a result of intervention.3 8
Understandably, the civil rights bar was critical of the deci-
sion.39 They read this message in Martin: plaintiffs could either
join all potentially affected nonparties or scale back affirmative
action remedial schemes to avoid impact on nonparties. 0 But
or collusion between the parties. Nor was the relief outlined in the decree transparently
invalid or the decree itself approved by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. Ac-
cording to the dissent, then, the white firefighters should lose on two counts: first, they
were not bound by the decree (in the sense that they had no rights or obligations under
the decree itself); and, second, they had not established any ground upon which they, as
nonparties, could collaterally attack the prior judgment. Id.
3" The dissent quoted an earlier opinion of Justice Rehnquist which suggests that,
while a decree may not bar a suit by a nonparty altogether, it may affect that nonparty's
rights by perhaps giving rise to good faith immunity to damage actions for the party
which implements the decree's terms. 490 U.S. at 770-71 n.4. See also Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (although third party not
"bound" by the prior decree, it is a "fact of economic and legal life"; existence of the
decree supported a finding that the per se rule should not be applied to defendant's
marketing practice).
" For Chief Justice Rehnquist, if the decree becomes a defense to the em-
ployer-presumably, whether an absolute defense or merely one to monetary liabil-
ity---"it is very difficult to see why respondents are not being 'bound' by the decree." Id.
at 765 n.6.
3' See Stephen L. Spitz, Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in Martin v. Wilks,
Publication of the Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under Law 14-28 (Feb. 20, 1990)
(detailing 11 post-Martin "reverse discrimination" suits challenging affirmative action
plans); S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990) ("Under the Wilks decision, a
new employment discrimination suit may be filed against an employer whenever that
employer hires or promotes an individual pursuant to a court decree."); Frank E. Deale,
Martin v. Wilks, 7 N.Y.L. Scm J. Hum. Rs. 83,90 (1990) ("It will be virtually impossible
to identify all individuals who might seek to relitigate the issues that have been resolved
by the consent decree."); but see Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 193, 236 ("At the very
least, Martin, by securing access to a hearing for affected incumbents, brought the proce-
dural law into conformity with the substantive doctrines."); Selig, supra note 13, at 22.
41 Professor Strickler wrote:
The import of the majority opinion is clear. A person whose interests may be
impaired by litigation, and who has not voluntarily become or been made a
party, may attack a prior decree at any time and without any limitation. Noth-
ing in the majority opinion limits its reach to consent decrees. If an outsider
who should have been joined under Rule 19 was not so joined that person may
collaterally attack any judgment in that proceeding. If this rule makes certain
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employers also had reservations about Martin since security in
the permanence of judgments serves their interests as well.4 1 Ab-
sent some protection under the umbrella of a decree, employers
face at worst double liability and at best repetitive litigation.
Another clear employer interest put at risk by Martin is the
ability of employers to shift some of the costs of redressing past
discrimination to white workers,42 although that interest is of
debatable legitimacy.
43
litigation difficult or impossible, that fact simply results from the drafting of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although stated in elusive terms, the
majority's message is that civil rights plaintiffs have no one to blame but them-
selves for difficulties caused by Rule 19. They can avoid the hardship by limit-
ing the "breadth" of their cases and the nature of the relief that they seek.
Strickler, supra note 4, at 1567-68 (footnotes omitted).
"' The Equal Employment Advisory Council (a national organization of private em-
ployers) stated in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Martin:
[Permitting endless challenges would] seriously affect the utility of consent de-
crees as a means of resolving class claims of discrimination in employment,
since much of the incentive to an employer to enter such a decree would be
destroyed if the employer were left vulnerable to subsequent lawsuits by per-
sons of groups claiming that the employer's compliance with the' consent de-
cree constituted discrimination against them.
Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 6, at 51-52.
42 For example, before Martin the employer could reduce the cost of redressing past
discrimination by agreeing to an affirmative action program limiting the opportunities of
the majority employees. From the employer's perspective, such relief was virtually cost-
free. Martin was a perfect case in point. At the outset of the litigation, it was estimated
that the cost in backpay to redress the complainants' grievances would be in excess of
five million dollars. The city was ultimately able to reduce the backpay award to
$265,000 by agreeing to a preferential promotion scheme. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at
243-44. Of course, the cost of deferred ivhite promotions would be borne by individual
incumbent employees who never agreed to entry of the consent order. Judith Resnik,
Judging Consent, 1987 U. CH. LEGAL F. 43.
In the wake of Martin, such remedial plans are subject to attack exposing the em-
ployer, at the very least, to a monetary claim by the adversely affected majority employ-
ees. Success by the majority workers in the subsequent suit, however, merely forces the
employer to pay the full cost of its discrimination: either the black employee will retain
the position obtained under the affirmative action plan, with the white employee getting
compensation for a deferred promotion, or, in the alternative, the majority worker will
bump the recently promoted black, with the black worker getting front pay until she
comes up for promotion. See generally SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, supra note 12, ch.
14.
If the employer were to resist such affirmative action plans in the post-Martin era,
the result will depend on the employer's success in avoiding a finding of discrimination.
If it prevails in the black plaintiffs' suit, its only cost will be those of defense. But if it
loses, it will still have to bear the full cost of its discrimination. This time, however, it
will be" liable to the minority workers in the form of front pay until they acquire the
position they would have had but for the discrimination.
" If the employer is in fact guilty of discrimination against blacks, it is troublesome
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From both parties' perspectives then, the lesson of Martin
is the need to ascertain all persons whose rights may be affected
by any court order. Such a determination is not only cumber-
some but is also ongoing throughout the litigation. Indeed, only
as a remedy is being finalized will the parties be in a position to
appreciate fully the potential impact on nonparties and act ac-
cordingly. Moreover, the parties may never be able to identify
all the possibly affected nonparties." In Martin itself, while the
parties could scarcely have had the prescience to predict which
particular employees would be hired in the future, the rights of
those future employees would be affected by the court's order.
As nonparties, they would not be bound by the prior judgment.
Nor would the holding in Martin have been any different if
the parties had litigated the matter to judgment instead of con-
senting to entry of a decree. As the Court made clear, its reason-
ing applies to fully litigated judgments as well as to consent de-
crees. Notice of ongoing litigation is simply not sufficient to bind
nonparties.
In short, Martin seemed to threaten public rights litigation
in general by presenting litigants with a Hobson's
choice-burdensome joinder or limiting the scope of equitable
relief. 45 In focusing on the rights of the nonparty, the Court also
for the employer to be permitted to shift some of the costs to white workers. Indeed, it
would not take much creativity to view such white workers as indirect, but real, victims
of violations of Title VII. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., School Dist.
No. 205, No. 91-2438, 1992 WL 80137 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1992) (Board of Education had
consented to scheme requiring teacher reassignment in violation of teachers' union con-
tract rights. Court viewed Board's agreement with plaintiff as improperly eliminating the
nonparties teachers' rights "for free" instead of buying out the rights); Laycock, supra
note 2; Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 241-47 (discussing the economic incentive for liti-
gants to pass the costs of a settlement to third parties). See jenerally Robert D. Cooter
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27
J. ECON. LITERATuRE 1067, 1075-78 (1989).
"' There has been some speculation as to whether joinder problems could not be
resolved by defendant class actions. This solution is extremely problematic, and the via-
bility of defendant class actions is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally I HER-
BERT B. NEWBERG. NEWBERG ON CLASs AcnoNS § 4.46 (2d ed. 1985); Strickler, supra note
4, at 1596-98; Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil
Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 283 (1985) (discussion of viability and requirements
of defendant classes and the role of Rule 23); Thomas D. Stoddard, Comment, Compul-
sory Joinder of Classes Under Rule 19, 58 U. CHL L Rav. 1453 (1991). See also Shimkus
v. Gersten Co., 816 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1987).
1' Justice Rehnquist alluded to the effect Martin would have on the scope of reme-




apparently gave short shrift to the need for integrity and consis-
tency in judgments or to the peculiar nature of public rights liti-
gation. Moreover, it ignored the fact that, in many other con-
texts, the interests of nonparties are often affected by prior
judgments and yet, because of countervailing considerations,
courts preserve the integrity of the original judgment.40
II. THE PROBLEM OF "CONFLICTING" JUDGMENTS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide two mecha-
nisms for avoiding conflicting judgments, both of which
were raised in Martin: Rule 19 puts the onus on the original
parties to bring new parties into the action by joinder, 7 while
The difficulties petitioners foresee in identifying those who could be adversely
affected by a decree granting broad remedial relief are undoubtedly present,
but they arise from the nature of the relief sought and not because of any
choice between mandatory intervention and joinder.
490 U.S. at 767. Any joinder problems, according to the Chief Justice, are a function of
the relief sought by the original complainant. If the complainant seeks structural changes
in the workplace that may affect nonparties, it must choose between broad joinder or a
vulnerable judgment. The way to escape this dilemma is to shape the remedial relief to
avoid the Martin problem, that is, limit the remedy to damages. Id.
A third equally unappealing option is for the parties to simply settle and take their
chances that adversely affected nonparties will not be motivated to launch a subsequent
attack on the decreed employment practice.
" See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (contractual
right for assigning teachers to schools may be altered by remedial scheme in school de-
segregation suit). See also text accompanying notes 68-100 infra.
'7 See generally Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 809 (1989); Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to
Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061 (1985); John C. McCoid, A Single
Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and
the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745 (1987).
One source provides a thumbnail sketch of the analysis under Rule 19:
Rule 19 governs compulsory joinder of parties. The Rule asks whether absen-
tees-individuals or entities not initially made parties to the litigation-should
be added to ensure a fair resolution of the case. Absentees are needed for just
adjudication when the entities have an interest in the suit that could be ad-
versely affected by resolution without them or when continuing without them
could detrimentally affect those already parties. When a court determines that
an absentee is needed for just adjudication, the judge must ascertain whether
joinder is feasible, an inquiry which entails consideration of subject matter ju-
risdiction, service of process and- venue. If the court finds joinder feasible, the
absentee "shall be joined as a party in the action." When joinder is infeasible,
the court must decide whether in "equity and good conscience" the plaintiff's
case should proceed without absentees or should be dismissed. The considera-
tions explicitly provided in Rule 19(b) guide this determination: the plaintiff's
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Rule 2448 permits strangers to the litigation to become parties by
intervention.49 To the extent that these devices are successful,
- conflicts of judgment will not occur.5 0 But when neither device is
employed, judgments entered in different actions may be incon-
sistent with one another.
5
1
Martin v. Wilks clearly rejects mandatory intervention as a
way of avoiding such conflicts and suggests the use of Rule 19
need for a forum in which to pursue relief, the potential for prejudice to absen-
tees' interests if the litigation continues without them, the defendant's concern
that it not be exposed to multiple or inconsistent suits or responsibilities, and
the interest of the public in efficacious resolution of controversies as well as
additional factors that may be relevant to equity and good conscience.
Tobias, supra note 9, at 319-20.
48 See note 28 supra.
" See generally Emma C. Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for
Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HRv. C.R.-C.L. L Rzy. 31 (1979); John E.
Kennedy, Let's All Join In Intervention Under Rule 24, 57 Ky. 1. 329 (1969); David L.
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
HARv. L. RE.v. 721 (1968); Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a
New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 894 (1980); Charles A. Sullivan,
Enforcement of Government Antitrust Consent Decrees by Private Parties: Third Party
Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor Status, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 822 (1975). See also Cindy
Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 57 U. CHL L. Rav. 279 (1990).
1 Tripartite litigation should be more efficient than separate actions by A and C
against B. But in many cases, C's prospective suit may be no more than a chimera. That
is,'there may be little prospect that C will sue, and little chance of success if he does. In
such cases, the use of Rule 19 joinder may prolong or complicate litigation because of a
phantom adversary. Further, B may actually employ the phantom strategically, resisting
settlement because of professed fears of C's rights or urging a court to limit equitable
relief in order to limit any impact on C (and therefore reduce Bs potential liability to C).
A complicating factor is that C's identity and interests may emerge clearly only after
the fact. When the suit is commenced by A against B, the possibility of affecting C de-
pends not only on A's success, but also on the way in which equitable relief is structured.
The scope of relief, in effect, defines C: in the employment discrimination area, for exam-
ple, relief ordering 10 years remedial seniority for A could affect C1, C2, and Ca, while 5
years seniority might affect only C3.
11 This views Rule 19 in its "offensive" role as a means of bringing new parties into
the action. Rule 19, however, also has a defensive aspect: dismissal of the action where
an "indispensable party" cannot be joined. Rule 19 may be used legitimately to guaran-
tee a comprehensive and consistent adjudication of the rights of all persons interested in
the subject matter of the action. It may also be used as a tactical device by the defend-
ant to thwart, or at least delay the vindication of plaintiffs' legal rights. This may be
done either by identifying such a multitude of "necessary" persons that the litigation
gets bogged down or by moving to dismiss the action because the court cannot obtain
jurisdiction over alleged nonparties. In the employment context, the first tactic can easily
be used by defendants. In the post-Martin era, the second is less feasible since the inter-
ested nonparties will probably be subject to the court's jurisdiction.
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joinder.5 2 But it does not provide the courts with any guidance
about dealing with such conflicts when they arise. To approach
that issue, consider the extent to which a judgment (whether by
consent or after litigation) between A and B affects C in various
cases, both within and outside of the employment discrimination
context.
Suppose A sues B, obtaining relief only in the form of a
money judgment requiring B to pay A $1,000,000. This will not
be viewed as affecting C's right to a judgment against B. How-
ever, C does not care about a judgment in the abstract-C wants
to collect. A's execution on his judgment against B might, in ef-
fect, prevent C from ever recovering. Nevertheless, the law does
not generally view this as sufficient to cast doubt on the first
judgment: the first creditor to obtain a judgment is generally
free to execute on it. To the extent that the debtor's assets may
not be sufficient to satisfy all present and potential judgments,
federal bankruptcy may protect the interests of C.13 Absent
bankruptcy, however, a money judgment for A may adversely af-
fect C's rights against B (at least in the sense that her remedy is
likely in practice to be less efficacious than it is in theory).
5 4
" Indeed, one commentator criticizes Martin as focusing on Rules 19 and 24 when
neither was in issue:
The majority's exclusive reliance on the Rules as a basis for the decision is
curious for several reasons. First, this appeal was not from a denial of interven-
tion, nor had the defendants in the original proceeding raised the defense of
nonjoinder under Rule 19. The Eleventh Circuit had resolved the case without
any reference to these Rules. More importantly, Rules 19 and 24 are no more
than mechanisms for joinder. Neither Rule addresses the preclusive effect of
litigation in which outsiders have not intervened or been joined.... Thus, an
unstated premise of the majority's holding is that the due process rights of the
white firefighters necessarily would be violated by giving binding effect to a
judgment in a proceeding in which they had not been joined formally as parties
either under Rule 19 or 24.
Strickler, supra note 4, at 1574-75. Professor Strickler concludes, "That premise, how-
ever, has never been the law." Id. at 1575.
11 See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Muddy Waters: A Clarification of the Common
Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case
(copy available from the authors). Even in this situation there may be an effect of the
prior judgment. It is true that a creditor with a mere judgment has no priority in bank-
ruptcy. But a creditor who has executed on the judgment by obtaining a lien does have
priority. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(36) & 506 (1988); 3 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 506.4 (15th ed. 1991).
51 Justice Stevens would view this as a case where the subsequent plaintiff is af-




The Martin problem is more severe when the judgment in
the A-B suit requires B to perform acts that are likely or even
certain to affect C. While C is not bound after Martin, the re-
sulting situation creates two problems: first, B is subject to some
form of additional liability to C; second, B may conceivably be
subject to conflicting court orders. These problems are at times
alternatives in that the conflict may sometimes be avoided by
double liability. For example, suppose B contracts to sell Black-
acre to A but had previously contracted to sell it to C. If A sues
B and obtains a decree of specific performance, Martin would
suggest that C is not bound. Therefore, C could later sue B. The
prior judgment has no effect on C's suit in the sense that it is no
defense, and C may relitigate any disputed issues (such as
whether the A-B contract was signed prior to the A-C con-
tract).5 5 On the other hand, if the judgment has been imple-
mented, then B no longer has title and therefore cannot give ti-
tle to C. C can, at most, get damages. This is true, even if under
the law of the jurisdiction in question, C would have priority
over A in obtaining specific performance, as when her contract
was earlier in time.56 While there may be different formulations
of this result,5" 7 the fact remains that a nonparty's options are
effectively limited by a prior judgment.
The Supreme Court has actually intimated a similar analy-
sis in the employment discrimination context. In W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers5 the employer entered into a
conciliation agreement with the EEOC. That agreement was,
however, inconsistent with the governing collective bargaining
agreement, and the union, although invited to participate in the
settlement negotiations, refused to do so. Ultimately, the com-
pany laid off certain workers in order to comply with the EEOC
Il RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDOMENTS § 34(3) (1982).
58 This example ignores the effect of recording statutes which could alter the result
if either A or C recorded the contract with B. However, land sale contracts are not nor-
mally recorded, and the principle stated would apply when neither was recorded and
both A and C were good faith purchasers (that is, neither contracted with knowledge of
the other's contract).
17 One way to rationalize the result is to say that the first decree effectively divests
B of ownership, thus leaving him unable to deed over the property to C. Another is to
speak in terms of in rem proceedings. Neither formulation, however, changes the reality
that a prior judgment can affect a nonparty in significant ways.
"W.I Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Lino-
leum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
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conciliation agreements requiring maintenance of the existing
proportion of women in the relevant bargaining unit. Those
workers, on the basis of the collective bargaining agreement
alone, would have retained their jobs. The union filed grievances
under the governing arbitration clause and ultimately was
awarded backpay for the workers whose rights under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement had been violated. 9
The Supreme Court, although recognizing that the award
was valid under normal labor arbitration principles, also ac-
knowledged that courts could not enforce an agreement violating
public policy. But the Court found no contrary public policy, ei-
ther in an interim order of the district court that the employer
not violate the EEOC conciliation agreement or in the concilia-
tion agreement itself. As for the court order, the Court recog-
nized the company's dilemma in being subject to conflicting ob-
ligations regarding layoffs. But the dilemma "was of the
Company's own making. The Company committed itself volun-
tarily to two conflicting contractual obligations."60 The existence
of one contract could not exonerate the company of liability for
breach of the other. Further, while the court order might have
required the actual layoffs to occur pursuant to the conciliation
agreement, "nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement as
interpreted by [the arbitrator] required the Company to violate
that order."'" As for the argument that the EEOC conciliation
agreement itself evidenced a public policy that barred the en-
forcement of the arbitration award, the Court used much the
same analysis.2
The company sought a court order barring the prosecution of such grievances.
Although the company was successful at the district court, the Fifth Circuit refused to
uphold the injunction. As a result, the arbitration was completed. Id. at 763-64.
60 Id. at 767.
6 Id. at 768. The award did not require layoffs nor require that any layoffs be in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement; it merely granted backpay for lay-
offs in violation of the labor agreement. The award, then, could not be struck down as
"creating] intolerable incentives to disobey court orders." Id. at 769. The Court did
suggest obliquely that an award requiring layoffs might be invalid because it would con-
flict with a court order. Id. at 769 n.13.
62 The Court noted that there was no showing that the collective bargaining agree-
ment itself violated Title VII; it therefore explicitly refrained from addressing whether
public policy would be violated by enforcing an arbitration award for breach of provi-
sions ultimately found to violate Title VI. What was at issue, then, was whether a con-
ciliation agreement could supersede another contract in the absence of any showing that
that contract violated the law. "
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In short, both the sale of real estate to two parties and the
Grace case demonstrate that a court decree-litigated or by con-
sent-can coexist with other rights. It will neither be binding on
nonparties in any technical sense nor necessarily affect their
rights adversely in a practical sense. While it is true that the
employer may be subject to double liability, that will simply be
the consequence of the employer assuming (by consent or court
order) two separate obligations.6 3
In Grace, however, the absence of a direct conflict between
two mandates resulted from the arbitrator's limiting relief to
backpay. Had he ordered reinstatement,6 ' the potential conflict
would have been greater. 5 But perhaps the arbitrator limited
the relief to backpay precisely because of the prior court order
that the conciliation agreement be followed. Indeed, the real es-
tate sale example suggests that a prior decree can affect a subse-
quent litigant. Under this view, C's rights may be affected by the
prior decree, even though C is not "bound" by it.(" This, of
course, sounds like Justice Stevens's dissent in Martin.
Another way of saying the same thing is that the prior judg-
While recognizing the strong Title VII policy in favor of voluntary compliance,
Grace stressed that the union had never consented to any modification of its collective
bargaining agreement, and "[a]bsent a judicial determination, the Commission, not to
mention the company, cannot alter the collective-bargaining agreement without the
Union's consent." Id. at 771. Such a result would undermine federal labor policy
designed to encourage collective bargaining.
11 See also Communications Workers of Am. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 21
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,329 (10th Cir. 1978) (action to enforce an arbitration award
permitted despite defendant's claim that the award was inconsistent with a consent de-
cree; the court found the two were not incompatible); Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v.
Valley West Des Moines Shopping Ctr., Inc., 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977) (court could
enjoin defendant shopping mall from carrying out contract with prospective tenant
where the contract violated terms of agreement between plaintiff, a jewelry store occu-
pant of the mall, and defendant; prospective tenant was not an indispensable party and
presumably could maintain a subsequent damage action against the mall owner for
breach of contract).
It might be argued that the arbitration award is somehow subordinate to a court
order. But courts may order enforcement of an award, and, in any event, the message of
Martin v. Wilks is that a prior proceeding cannot bind nonparties: it would seem irrele-
vant that the subsequent proceeding was an arbitration rather than a court suit.
"I Note, however, that even here there is no logical inconsistency . the game is a zero
sum one only because the employer chose to reduce its workforce. If the employer's
promises require it to employ a certain number of minority workers and white workers, it
can do so by expanding its workforce.
" While the word "bound" is sometimes used to apply to stare decisis, in the sense
of "binding law," that is not the way in which "bound" is used for preclusion purposes.
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ment affects the remedy, not the right. In the real estate sale
case, C has as much right after A's judgment to sue B as C had
before; only when the restriction on possible remedies effectively
destroys any means of vindicating that right would it be fair to
say that the right itself is destroyed.
Further, the word "right" must be stressed. In the contract
example, C has a right in the narrowest meaning of that term:
the law will provide a remedy to C for B's breach of the contract,
regardless of whether B has also breached any obligations to A.
In many cases, however, C will not have a right, but only an
expectation: if B will not contract with C because of a preexist-
ing contract with A, C has no legal claim. We would not speak of
C being bound by the contract (or by a judgment entered enforc-
ing it specifically) even though the judgment prevents C from
pursuing her interests.
While these problems have been most prominent in the em-
ployment discrimination area, they have arisen elsewhere. Al-
though there are cases consistent with the stringent approach of
Martin to the effect of judgments on nonparties, 7 there are sev-
67 One of the strongest Supreme Court precedents for Martin, is Chase Nat'l Bank
v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934). There, the Norwalk City Council passed a reso-
lution requiring the Ohio Electric Power Company to remove electrical equipment which
served the city's residents under a franchise which, the city claimed, had expired. At the
city's request, the state prosecuting attorney brought a quo warranto proceeding to oust
the company from its use of city streets. The state courts entered a judgment of ouster.
The city, however, was not a party to these proceedings. Further, before these actions,
the Power Company had mortgaged the property in question to certain bondholders, but
neither party sought to join the bondholders in the ouster proceedings, and the bond-
holders did not seek to intervene.
After the state court judgment, a trustee for the bondholders brought a diversity
suit in the federal court against the city, claiming that the city's enforcement of the
ouster would irreparably harm its interests. The federal court, to preserve the bondhold-
ers' lien, "enjoined the City, its officers, agents and employees, 'and all persons whomso-
ever to whom notice of this order shall come,'" from interfering with the continuing
operations of the Power Company and "'from taking any steps or action of any kind
whatever to cause the enforcement or carrying out'" of the ouster judgment. Id. at 434-
35.
In a doublebarreled vindication of the rights of nonparties, Justice Brandeis first
held this injunction erroneous insofar as it purported to enjoin nonparties from enforcing
the ouster: "The City alone was named as defendant. No person other than the City was
served with process. None came otherwise before the court." Id. at 436. Second, Brandeis
approved the decree's enjoining of the city:
Neither the trustee nor the City had been a party, or privy, to the litigation in
the state courts. These courts did not purport to pass upon the validity of the
trustee's claim; and in no state court was that claim in litigation. However
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eral areas where, on one ground or another, the courts have in
effect bound nonparties to judgments. Since most of these areas
were discussed in pre-Martin lower federal court decisions, it is
conceivable that they do not survive Martin. But it is doubtful
that the Martin Court truly intended to have spoken so broadly.
There are three main areas for the operation of court de-
crees against nonparties: first, judicial power to enforce its own
judgments through the contempt power; second, in rem orders;
and, third, the so-called "public rights" exception. United
States v. Hall"' epitomizes the first area.69 Hall upheld the
power of a district court to punish by criminal contempt "a per-
son who, though neither a party nor bearing any legal relation-
ship to a party, violates a court order designed to protect the
court's judgment in a school desegregation case."17 0 Racial vio-
lence erupted in a Florida high school after a desegregation or-
der was put into effect causing a temporary closing. The school
district then obtained a federal court order barring interference
with the orderly operation of the school. The order provided
broad the scope of the prohibition prescribed by Judicial Code, § 265, it could
not preclude the federal court from protecting the trustee's alleged property
from wanton destruction by one not a party or privy to the judgment of ouster.
Id. at 437-38. This result seems unobjectionable, provided that the trustee was not con-
sidered in privity with the Power Company, a position Brandeis thought (in these pre-
Erie days) established "under well settled principles of jurisdiction, governing all
courts," federal and state. Id. at 438.
Presaging Martin's rejection of mandatory intervention, Brandeis directly rebuffed
the argument that the trustee's suit should be dismissed because it had neither inter-
vened in the state proceeding nor justified its failure to intervene (as by lack of notice).
Brandeis wrote:
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the
burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. Whether
under the Ohio practice it would have been possible for the trustee to inter-
vene, we have no occasion to determine. Unless duly summoned to appear in a
legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recov-
ered therein will not affect his legal rights.
Id. at 441.
Finally, since the decree against the city did not interfere with the state court pro-
ceedings, sinCe it left the plaintiff there free to act, there was no violation of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 265.
472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1973).
"g See also Quinter v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 676 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (expert
witness held in contempt for violating a discovery protective order despite not being a
party to the suit, nor named in the order); Nancy L. Krzton, Note, Due Process Con-
cerns in Discovery: Who May Protective Orders Bind?, 44 U. Prrr. L REv. 1081 (1983).
1* 472 F.2d at 262.
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that anyone having notice of it was subject to its terms. Eric
Hall was named in the petition as one responsible for the unrest
but was neither a party to the underlying litigation nor joined as
a party before the order was entered.
Hall's conviction of criminal contempt was challenged on
two grounds. First, he claimed that the court had no power to
punish a nonparty acting solely in pursuit of his own interests.
He relied on prior cases which had drawn precisely this distinc-
tion, seeming to say that a nonparty could not be held in con-
tempt unless it were an agent of a party (obviously, the analog
of privies under the law of judgments) or "aided and abetted"
contempt by parties.71 But the Fifth Circuit distinguished those
cases:
[There] the activities of third parties, however harmful they might
have been to the plaintiffs' interests, would not have disturbed in any
way the adjudication of rights and obligations as between the original
plaintiffs and defendants .... The activities of Hall, however,
threatened both the plaintiffs' right and the defendant's duty as adju-
dicated in the [earlier] litigation.
7 2
71 In Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930), a decree was entered
against John Staff, "'his agents, employees, associates and confederates,' enjoining them
from infringing, or 'aiding or abetting or in any way contributing to the infringement,'"
of a patent. Id. at 832. When enforcement was later sought against John's brother Jo-
seph, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We agree that a person who knowingly assists a defendant in violating an in-
junction subjects himself to civil as well as criminal proceedings for contempt.
This is well settled law. On the other hand no court can make a decree which
will bind any one but a party; a court of equity is as much so limited as a court
of law; it cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it
words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro tanto brutum fulmen,
and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it.
Id. (citations omitted). To be bound by the decree, Hand believed that a nonparty "must
either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified with him." Id. at 833.
In Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934), discussed in note 67
supra, the Court cited Alemite approvingly. While conceding that nonparties may be
enjoined "from knowingly aiding a defendant in performing a prohibited act if their rela-
tion is that of associate or confederate," Justice Brandeis disapproved the district court's
injunction insofar as it purported to reach any person having notice, and thus threatened
with "contempt the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not
been adjudged according to law." Id. See also Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9
(1945). See generally Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53
TEx. L. REv. 873 (1975).
72 Hall, 472 F.2d at 265:
Infringement of the Alemite plaintiff's patent by a third party would not have
upset the defendant's duty to refrain from infringing or rendered it more diffi-
cult for the defendant to perform that duty. Similarly, the defendant's duty in
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The court went on to stress that, by preventing the desegrega-
tion order from being effective, activities of persons such as Hall
"imperiled the court's fundamental power to make a binding ad-
judication between the parties properly before it.173 The courts,
therefore, have inherent power to bind nonparties to the extent
necessary to protect their judgments. Having dispensed with the
common law question, the Hall court had little difficulty with
whether Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lim-
ited judicial power. Although that Rule seems to explicitly limit
an injunction's effect,7 4 it could not be read literally. Rather,
Rule 65(d) was "a codification rather than a limitation of courts'
common-law powers, [and] cannot be read to restrict the inher-
ent power of a court to protect its ability to render a binding
judgment.
7 5
The persuasiveness of this reasoning after Martin may be
doubted: had Hall filed suit against the desegregation order in-
stead of protesting it, the "plaintiffs' right and the defendant's
duty" would also be threatened, and "the court's fundamental
power to make a binding adjudication between the parties prop-
erly before it" would be equally "imperiled." Martin implies
that Hall could bring a second action though the case does not
disclose what effect the first decree might have on Hall's
remedy.
The second area in which a judgment can affect the rights
of nonparties is in rem injunctions. Indeed, Hall relied strongly
on this point in support of its decision."6 In rem proceedings
Chase National Bank to refrain from removing the plaintiff's equipment would
remain undisturbed regardless of the activities of third parties, as would the
plaintiff's right not to have its equipment removed by the defendant.
7 Id. at 265.
7" Rule 65(d) provides that an injunction "is binding only upon the parties to the
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons
in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise."
75 Id. at 267. For a critical analysis of Hall prior to Martin, see Rendelman, supra
note 71.
"' "Federal courts have issued injunctions binding on all persons, regardless of no-
tice, who come into contact with property which is the subject of a judicial decree." Id.
at 266. School desegregation orders, which are often controversial, "are, like in rem or-
ders, particularly vulnerable to disruption by an undefinable class of persons who are
neither parties nor acting at the instigation of parties. In such cases, as in voting rights
cases, courts must have the power to issue orders similar to that issued in this case,
tailored to the exigencies of the situation and directed to protecting the court's judg-
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
"presuppose the existence of a legal relationship which is con-
ceived of as property." Where such property exists, courts may
"exercise jurisdiction to determine interests" in that property; it I
is not necessary that persons claiming such interests be parties
to be bound. All that is necessary, as a matter of due process, is
that adequate notice of the pending proceeding be provided to
those who may have such an interest. Assuming such notice, the
jurisdiction of the court binds the nonparties, but only so far as
the property in question is concerned. 8
In some sense, in rem proceedings are like mandatory inter-
vention: a person with notice of the proceeding is bound even if
she does not participate. Thus, there is an incentive for an out-
sider to participate, although initiating such participation is not
denominated intervention. The limits of in rem are unclear,
largely because there have been extensions of this jurisdiction
beyond what is intuitively viewed as property. 9 But the Court
in Martin was unwilling to view the employment relationship at
issue there as a property claim.80
The third area is what has been called the "public rights
exception," which has less-than-definitive origins. It was appar-
ently first raised in 1940 in a labor law case National Licorice
Co. v. NLRB,81 in which the NLRB set aside contracts that the
company had procured from its employees by means of unfair
labor practices. When the company challenged the NLRB's or-
ment." Id.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6, cmt. c (1982).
78 See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
71 In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979), discussed in text beginning at note 85 infra, the Court suggested in
dicta that nonparties could be bound by a dispute over Indian fishing rights. Rather than
view the rights as individual claims, the Court suggested that the issue could be viewed
as an in rem proceeding allocating rights in fisheries. But, of course, "fisheries" do not
exist as other than a legal way to control individual rights to fish.
80 The Court may have wished to avoid the due process questions that would have
arisen had the in rem analogy been used. By focusing only on the Federal Rules, the
Court avoided addressing the outer limits of due process rights of nonparties. In Wash-
ington State Fishing Vessel Ass'n, the Court, although it suggested an in rem theory,
ultimately refused to adopt it. This reluctance may have stemmed from uncertainties
about the adequacy of the notice to the nonparties before in rem jurisdiction could be
exercised.
81 309 U.S. 350 (1940). Under the public rights exception, when plaintiffs seek vindi-
cation of public rights, nonparties who could be adversely affected by a judgment are
nonetheless not treated as indispensable parties. For a critical analysis urging the aban-
donment of the public rights exception, see Tobias, supra note 47.
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der because of the absence of the employees, the Supreme Court
affirmed. It compared the proceeding to the antitrust area where
injunctions and orders of the Federal Trade Commission often
affected nonparties by barring the defendant from meeting con-
tractual obligations to those not before the court.6 2 In either
case, "the public right [is] vindicated by restraining the unlawful
actions of the defendant even though the restraint prevent[s] his
performance of the contracts."8 3 The National Licorice Court
found acceptable this burden on the contractual rights of non-
parties because such adjudications do not destroy the legal enti-
tlements of the absent parties: "In every case the third persons
were left free to assert such legal rights as they might have ac-
quired under their contracts.
814
This formulation of a public rights exception seems consis-
tent with our real estate sale example: the right remains unaf-
fected, only the remedy is reduced. A broader view of a public
rights exception, however, emerged in Washington v. Washing-
ton State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,85 a com-
plicated case involving disputes over the rights of various Indian
tribes in the Northwest to take certain fish under treaties with
the federal government. Different suits culminated in divergent
decisions in the Ninth Circuit and the Washington Supreme
Court. The federal litigation, brought by the United States, re-
sulted in an injunction requiring the state's Department of Fish-
eries to adopt regulations protecting the Indians' treaty rights.
These regulations, however, were challenged in state court suits,
ending with the state supreme court holding that the Depart-
ment of Fisheries could not comply with the federal injunction."'
This state court action led the federal court to issue orders di-
rectly supervising Washington State's fisheries to preserve treaty
fishing rights.
At the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
82 Id. at 365.
" Id. at 366.
" Id. Similarly, to require joinder of employees covered by the subject labor con-
tracts would undermine enforcement of the NLRA. Further, the NLRB's order, which
was "directed solely to the employer," was "ineffective to determine any private rights of
the employees and leaves them free to assert such legal rights as they may have acquired
under their contracts, in any appropriate tribunal... ." Id. at 366.
" 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
The- state court essentially rejected the federal court's decision because of its di-
vergent view of federal law.
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jority, recognized "widespread defiance" of the district court's
orders and noted that certiorari had been granted in both the
state and federal cases in part "to remove any doubts about the
federal court's power to enforce its orders. '8 7 After resolving the
merits of the dispute, the Court turned to the procedural mo-
rass. One claim was that the federal district court lacked power
to enjoin individual fishermen, who were not parties, from vio-
lating its fishing allocations.88 Although individual fishermen
had had some representation by commercial fishing organiza-
tions as amici in the federal suit, the Court did not rely on this
point. Instead, it wrote:
In our view, the commercial fishing associations and their members
are probably subject to injunction under either the rule that nonpar-
ties who interfere with the implementation of court orders establish-
ing public rights may be enjoined, e. g., United States v. Hall, 472
F.2d 261 (CA5 1972), cited approvingly in Golden State Bottling Co.
v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 180, or the rule that a court possessed of the
res in a proceeding in rem, such as one to apportion a fishery, may
enjoin those who would interfere with that custody. But in any case,
these individuals and groups are citizens of the State of Washington,
which was a party to the relevant proceedings, and "they, in their
common public rights as citizens of the State, were represented by the
State in those proceedings, and, like it, were bound by the judgment."
Moreover, a court clearly may order them to obey that judgment.2
The notion that state citizens may be bound by litigation in
which the state represents them has important implications for
the view of representation taken by the new Civil Rights Act.9 0
But for present purposes, the more interesting part of this pas-
sage is the formulation of a "public rights exception" to the no-
tion that decrees cannot bind nonparties. This principle seems
to be generalized from the narrower holding in Hall.
Of course, the authority of any public rights exception is
8 Id. at 674.
" The Court noted that this issue arose because
state officials were either unwilling or unable to enforce the District Court's
orders against nontreaty fishermen by way of state regulations and state law
enforcement efforts. Accordingly, nontreaty fishermen were openly violating
Indian fishing rights, and, in order to give federal law enforcement officials the
power via contempt to end those violations, the District Court was forced to
enjoin them.
Id. at 692 n.32.
:9 Id. (some citations omitted).
90 See text accompanying notes 134-37 infra.
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doubtful. On its face, the language in Washington Fishing Ves-
sel Ass'n is dicta. Moreover, it was penned by Justice Stevens,
who, after all, dissented in Martin.9' Nevertheless, the notion of
a public rights exception has gained support.
One of the more interesting lower court cases in this area
played out in the environmental arena. Conner v. Burford"2
originated in a challenge to federal agencies' leasing of national
forest land in Montana to certain oil and gas developers 3 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's disapproval of those
leases that lacked "no surface occupancy" clauses limiting devel-
opment by the lessees until the lessees secured further approval
by the Bureau of Land Management. Obviously, such action
threatened the interests of the lessees, some of whom, after
judgment was entered but before the federal defendants filed a
notice of appeal, sought to intervene "as necessary and indispen-
sable parties" under Rule 19. The lessees also asked for recon-
sideration on the ground that the decision deprived them of due
process. The district court denied the intervenors' general appli-
cation as untimely, although it permitted them to intervene for
the purposes of appeal of the judgment.
At the Ninth Circuit, the lessees argued that they were in-
dispensable in the action below and thus the district court
should not have set aside the agency leases. While there was no
dispute that the lessees were "necessary parties" (that is, they
should have been joined if joinder were feasible), the plaintiffs
contended that the leaseholders were not "indispensable par-
ties" because of the public rights exception. The Ninth Circuit
agreed, citing National Licorice.94 As formulated by Conner, the
public rights exception is of limited applicability. The court
noted that the litigation against the federal agencies "does not
purport to adjudicate the rights of current lessees; it merely
0' Interestingly, Stevens's dissent in Martin does not invoke any public rights
exception.
92 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
" The claim was that the leases violated the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4361, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-
1543, because neither an environmental impact statement nor a biological opinion on the
impact on endangered species was obtained.
" It also cited, inter alia, Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919
(11th Cir. 1982); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981); National Resources




seeks to enforce the public right to administrative compliance
with the environmental protection standards of NEPA and the
ESA."9 5 While the district court purported to actually "set
aside" the leases, the Ninth Circuit clarified the order to provide
that "the contracts themselves were not invalidated and further
actions construing rights under them are not precluded." 0
Rather, the court simply "enjoin[ed] the federal defendants
from permitting any surface-disturbing activity to occur on any
of the leases until they have fully complied" with the governing
laws, that is, until the agencies conducted the required studies97
At this point, the court seemed to be suggesting that the
judgment against the government might at most affect the les-
sees' remedies, not their rights:
The order as modified does not adjudicate or "prejudge" the rights of
the lessees against the government. We enjoin only the actions of the
government; the lessees remain free to assert whatever claims they
may have against the government. Thus, the public right to compli-
ance with environmental standards is vindicated with a minimum im-
position on the rights of lessees. 8
If the suggestion was that the decision only made the govern-
ment liable on the ultra vires leases, the court immediately went
on to indicate a broader effect:
The order as modified will obviously preclude immediate government
approval of surface-disturbing activity, but such foreclosure of the les-
sees' ability to get "specific performance" until the government com-
plies with NEPA and the ESA is insufficient to make the lessees indis-
pensable to this litigation .... [W]e retain in the leaseholders many
of the fundamental attributes of their contracts. As strenuously ar-
gued by both the government and the lessees, significant economic
value inheres in the exclusive right to engage in oil and gas activities,
should any be allowed. Once the government complies with NEPA
and the ESA, it is entirely possible that it will authorize surface-dis-
turbing activities on many of the leased tracts. Thus, although devel-
opment probably will be delayed, it is conceivable that it will occur on
some of the leases already sold. The legally protected interests of the
lessees are barely affected until the government decides that no devel-
opment and production of the oil and gas reserves will be allowed, and
even then they may have claims for damages against the
95 848 F.2d at 1460.
98 Id. at 1460-61 (quoting Brief for Plantiff-Appellees at 36).
o Id. at 1461.




The startling conclusion of Conner appeared to be that, al-
though not parties to the action, the lessees could be barred
from working their leases without further governmental action.
Since there was no guarantee that surface-disturbing activity
would ever be authorized, the value of the leases was substan-
tially affected. Further, while the contemplated impact state-
ments might justify government approval of further activities,
they also might preclude such approval. In that case, the leases
would appear to be worthless. In short, the court seemed to be
saying that since the leases were not technically invalidated, the
lessees were not indispensable parties despite a contemplated
adverse effect.100
99 Id. The Conner court also noted that the lessee-intervenors "have robustly repre-
sented the interests of the entire lessee class on appeal." Id. at 1462. Further, "the ab-
sent lessees were adequately represented by the government below [which] vigorously
defended its leasing decisions under both NEPA and the ESA." Id. at 1462.
ZOO See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), where
the court enjoined the Department of the Interior from lifting protective restrictions on
180 million acres of federal land. The district court's injunction was challenged on the
basis, inter alia, that it "impermissibly affects the rights and interest of absent third
parties." The court rejected this argument, although it recognized some effect on third
parties:
The injunction's only actual effect on third parties is lost or delayed opportu-
nity to consummate transactions for the purchase or use of federal lands in the
future. These interests, however, are not constitutionally protected property
rights. The absent third parties to whom appellants refer stand in various
stages in the process of perfecting their interests in the lands at issue. Some
parties have staked initial claims, or taken other preliminary steps, but require
[the Bureau of Land Management] BLM to take further action before they can
complete their development projects. The injunction prohibits the BLM from
acting to further these projects during the pendency of this litigation (presum-
ing such action would conflict with the original classification or withdrawal).
Thus, some third parties are delayed in obtaining certain interests-e.g., re-
ceiving approval to drill oil and gas wells on leases issued prior to the injunc-
tion, perfecting final entries, obtaining patents under the land laws-as a re-
sult of the injunction. But these absent parties have no contractual or legal
right to additional BLM permits or approvals. They hold no more than an
expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property
within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. Their ab-
sence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the
preliminary injunction.
Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted). Judge Williams, writing separately, agreed that the
third parties were not indispensible within the meaning of Rule 19. But he noted that
"under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment persons normally cannot be
bound by litigation to which they were not parties or privies." Id. at 333. Since the ab-
sentees were not legally bound,
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Conner was decided before Martin. Had the lessees had the
foresight to predict that decision, intervention was the last de-
vice they should have attempted.10' Martin would suggest that
the decision setting aside the leases did not bind the leasehold-
ers who were not parties to the action against the federal agen-
cies. But does that mean that the decree against the government
cannot affect their rights? Suppose the leaseholders engage in
development activity; at the extreme, when the government
(pursuant to the Conner injunction) seeks to bar them, that
judgment has no binding force (other than possible stare decisis
effects), allowing them to relitigate the issue. More narrowly, a
subsequent court might view the government as barred from al-
lowing development of the leased tracts, but hold the govern-
ment liable to the leaseholders for any damages that follow.
In short, the question is whether Martin should be read to
eradicate,'or alter, various doctrines permitting nonparties to be
affected by court orders. The previous discussion suggests that
the conventional wisdom-that Martin held that a prior judg-
ment can never affect a nonparty's rights or interests-is incor-
rect. A more accurate statement of the holding is that a non-
party cannot be required to intervene in a prior suit in order to
protect any interests that may be threatened by that litigation.
While there is certainly dictum in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion which speaks in terms of the prior judgment not binding
a nonparty, the Court did not purport to address the ways in
which judgments can be reconciled.102
How then should a court address a suit by C in an action
against B when there is a prior decree in A's favor requiring cer-
tain conduct by B which injures C? There are several possi-
bilities.
I take it that, for example, a mineral lessee that was denied a drilling permit to
which it would otherwise be entitled could seek judicial relief against the BLM.
A federal court outside this district would not be bound by the decision in the
trial court or here, and, if it viewed the law differently, might order relief.
Id.
101 Successful intervention would make the leaseholders parties, and therefore
bound, in a case where the presiding judge had already held against their interests. In
fact, the leaseholders may have foreseen this problem: they did not seek to intervene
individually; rather, their interests were urged by associations.
102 Stated otherwise, the Court merely held that the prior decree was not a complete
defense in the C-B suit. It did not consider the effect the first suit (A-B) might have on




One possibility is that the decree somehow immunizes what
would otherwise be illegal. This seems to be Justice Stevens's
view, although he does not speak the language of immunity.10 3
Justice Stevens's position seems weakest precisely at this point:
he would apparently permit white workers to lose their right not
to be subordinated to blacks in promotions. While the right of
the white workers is conditional-it exists absent discrimination
against blacks or the presence of a valid affirmative action
plan-neither of these conditions has been determined to exist
in a proceeding to which such persons are parties.'" Is it not fair
to say that, under the dissent's view, such persons are losing a
legal right and are therefore "bound" by the decree?
One response is that the law simply does not view individu-
als as "bound" to acts to which they are not parties, even though
such acts may radically affect them. To borrow an analogy from
another area of Title VII, a disadvantaged employee is not
viewed as legally "bound" by a seniority system agreed to by the
union and the employer. Nevertheless, the system is a fact of life
for her and in practice may substantially affect her interests.
This analysis, however, only takes us so far: the junior em-
ployee has no "right" to challenge the seniority system in the
first place. But Justice Stevens would presumably have nonpar-
ties, who previously had a right not to be victims of discrimina-
tion because of their white race, barred precisely by the entry of
a decree-typically, the function of preclusion "binding"
principles.105
103 490 U.S. at 788-91. See also Strickler, supra note 4, at 1569.
10, Justice Stevens reviewed in detail the proceedings leading up to the consent de-
crees in question. The point of this review was to establish that the district court never
treated the white firefighters as if they were "bound" in the technical sense. But the
review does clearly indicate that the prior order affected the white firefighters' opportu-
nity for promotion.
1l Professor Strickler writes:
The problem with the dissents view is that it ignores the reality of what hap-
pened to the white firefighters. If the consent decree had not existed, race-
conscious promotions by the City that favored black firefighters arguably
would have violated the rights of white firefighters under Title VII and the
fourteenth amendment. . .But if the City could use the consent decree ei-
ther as evidence of a lack of discriminatory intent or as providing an immunity
from liability for actions consistent with the decree, the white firefighters' Title
VII and fourteenth amendment claims would be rendered all but usele3s.
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B. Ignore the Decree
Another possibility is that the court should decide C's suit
as if the prior decree did not exist. The decree would then be
irrelevant. This seems to be the majority's rule in Martin, but is
also inappropriate. The most obvious problem arises from the
possibility that the court in the C-B suit will order relief directly
contrary to a judgment in the A-B suit. B will then be subject to
inconsistent obligations. No legal system can tolerate an equita-
ble system in which B will be damned if he does, and damned if
he doesn't-that is, subject to contempt no matter what B does.
Casting some light on this is the tendency of courts to take
into account the interests of third parties in fashioning relief,
even if they have no clearly defined "right."106 It seems hardly
unfair to require a court to also take into account the rights of
the prior plaintiffs as reflected in a court order. 107
Strickler, supra note 4, at 1572-73. Professor Strickler goes on to cite Logan v. Zimmer.
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), as holding that the right to litigate a cause of action
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Thus, even if
one takes the most generous possible construction of the district court's ruling, the con-
sent decree deprived the white firefighters of their right to litigate the merits of their
Title VII claim." Strickler, supra, at 1573.
106 See Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 717 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983), where,
with respect to competitive seniority (which determined such matters as layoffs) class
members were granted seniority "equal only to the number of days the claimants had
previously been employed as flight attendants by United." Id. at 1142. As a result, the
class members would end up junior to flight attendants hired long after the class mem-
berg were unlawfully discharged for getting married. The appellate court upheld the or-
der, stressing that, in an economic climate of massive layoffs, to reinstate all 1400 would
require that "all incumbent attendants hired by United since March 7, 1977, would be
furloughed," and that the prospects were bleak enough that these individuals would not
be recalled; they would, therefore, effectively be fired. Id. at 1151. See generally Carpen-
ter, supra note 15.
10" Arguably, the Romasanta court was wrong: it should have awarded the victims of
discrimination full relief and let the affected nonparties vindicate their rights, if any,
under the collective bargaining agreement.
Note that if the class members were truly the victims of illegal discrimination, giving
them full seniority is unobjectionable. Further, in the case itself, the illegality of the
airline's conduct was hardly arguable, and was in fact fully litigated. Even assuming that
there was a dispute about this (or, at least, that some of the class members were not the
victims of the clearly discriminatory policies), the rights of the co-workers seem
problematic.
If B agrees to jump A over C in seniority, what claim does C have? If seniority is
only a policy of B which is subject to change at B's will, there can be no objection to B's
sacrificing C's interests to B's own interests. If, on the other hand, C's rights derive from
a contract (whether a collective bargaining agreement or a contract derived from a con-
sistent policy), then the decree cannot affect C's contract right. At most, the decree will
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C. "Reconcile" the Decrees
A third possibility is that the prior decree should be consid-
ered by the court in the subsequent litigation in the sense that
the court should modify the prior decree so that no inconsis-
tency arises. This is at least conceivable when the two suits are
brought before the same court; it is impossible, however, when
the suits cannot be so joined. And, even when procedurally pos-
sible, there is an enormous conceptual problem: C is not bound
to the A-B litigation because C is a nonparty. It follows that A
cannot be bound in the C-B litigation, to which A is also a non-
party. The solution to possible unfairness to C is not to strip A
of rights won through his suit.
Thus, the prior decree should be considered in either of two
ways: first, as above, by modifying a prior decree entered by the
same court where possible; second, by taking into account the
prior order in fashioning the relief available in the second suit,
that between C and B. Again, the absence of A from the B-C
lawsuit will often, but not always, prevent modification of the
prior decree.
The question, then, becomes which of the two methods
should be selected. At this point, we leave the law of preclusion
and consider the law of joinder and intekvention. The court in
the B-C suit cannot alter the A-B decree unless A is made a
party to C's suit: while C's rights may or may not have been
affected by the A-B decree, it is clear that any alteration to the
A-B decree will affect A's rights.03 One way to look at this is
that C is put to a choice by the prior decree: C can sue in the
original court and seek to join A, and thereby preserve the possi-
bility of full relief. Alternatively, C can sue in any court, not join
A, and settle for whatever relief the court can order consistent
with the prior decree.
bar one remedy that C might otherwise obtain: an order of reinstatement. C should still
have a right to monetary relief.
One might suspect that C will fare less well after the A-B decree than before, but
that prediction is by no means a certainty, and is one with which the law is normally
unconcerned. Indeed, the more likely loser in this situation is B, who will be held to
perform his obligations to A under the decree and his obligations to C under the
contract.
"08 A's rights, not merely A's remedy, are affected. Whatever rights A may have had
in his original cause of action are merged in the judgment. Therefore, reducing A's rights
by modifying the judgment is impermissible without A being made a party to the action.
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This sounds something like "mandatory intervention," the
rule almost unanimously applied by the circuit courts before
Martin. It is, however, considerably different: there is no re-
quirement that C intervene in the A-B litigation; C may do so
(assuming C meets the requirements of rule 24) or C may bring
a separate suit challenging the employment practice required by
the A-B decree, joining A in that separate suit. If C fails to do
either, C may still sue B, but C's relief is limited to the extent
that otherwise appropriate relief would violate the decree.Y°)
This is less than mandatory intervention in that the failure to
intervene leaves C free to sue, subject to the prior decree only in
the sense that the court will not enter a conflicting judgment. 1 0
The most problematic aspect of this approach is the possi-
bility that the decree is itself mandating violations of positive
law. While that possibility is present for both litigated judg-
ments and consent decrees, the absence of true adversarialness
may mean that it is more likely to occur with consent decrees.
This, of course, was the point of the white firefighters' attack in
Martin v. Wilks itself: they claimed that the employer's prac-
tices would, but for the decree, violate at least the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and that the decree could not immunize such a vio-
lation. While there is no constitutional principle giving public
employees a right to employment opportunity, there are certain
grounds upon which opportunities cannot be allocated. Most ob-
viously, with the exception of those cases where there is a com-
pelling state interest justifying it (such as remedying past dis-
log But see United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1989) (white
employees in second suit should not be limited to damage remedy). Whether the affected
nonparty has an effective damage remedy is problematic. In some instances, the applica-
ble federal law will not allow for a damage remedy, thereby implicating due process
concerns.
10 Professor Strickler, argues that; while the consent decree did not "bind the white
firefighters in the sense of requiring any action or payment by them," the decree "cer-
tainly affected them in two ways: as a practical matter it reduced their promotional op-
portunities at work, and it changed the legal status of their Title YII claims, by signifi-
cantly reducing their chances of success in that litigation." Strickler, supra note 4, at
1570-71. This is not self-evident. Promotional opportunities may practically be reduced,
but this will survive legal challenge only if the reduction is permissible under Title VII
and the Constitution. If it is permissible, no right has been infringed. See Donaghy v.
City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 938 (1992). The
key question is whether the first decree will affect the subsequent court's assessment of
the legality of the remedial employment practice, and it is not clear why the prior decree
will reduce the chances of success in that litigation at all.
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crimination), A cannot be preferred to C simply because A is
black. Even here, however, a decree will rarely require unequal
treatment: it will merely order benefits that, if they are uncon-
stitutional, can be matched by according them to the white
plaintiffs.
In short, much of the debate over Martin v. Wilks seems
misconceived, at least when framed in the terms of the discus-
sion as it has developed. The issue is not the applicability of
Rule 19 or Rule 24 or even preclusion, but rather the correct way
in which to treat potentially conflicting judgments. To that ex-
tent, Martin does not threaten any judgments already entered:
at most it subjects employers to the possibility of double liabil-
ity. Much the same is true outside the discrimination context.
After a decree is entered, the case signifies little.
Martin v. Wilks, however, is a more serious problem for
those contemplating settling pending litigation by a consent de-
cree. While an employer who has a decree entered against it may
simply view Martin as a piece of bad news, employers facing
suits after that opinion was rendered must consider how to avoid
potential double liability. Similarly, civil rights plaintiffs seeking
broad relief can expect employers to be more resistant now that
a possible "decree shield" has been stripped away.
Nevertheless, it is not clear how substantially the conduct of
either side would have been altered. Because employers are no
safer behind a litigated decree than one entered by consent, it is
not clear that Martin has substantially reduced incentives to
settle. In either case, true protection can be achieved under
Martin only by joining all potentially affected third parties. Per-
haps the most likely result of Martin, then, will be to reinforce a
tendency of parties to litigation to frame relief in ways that
would not affect nonparties, or would affect only those nonpar-
ties which could feasibly be joined. Of course, this brings us back
to the original joinder problems generated by the Martin deci-
sion which Congress tried to ameliorate by passing the 1991
Civil Rights Act.
III. THE 1991 CIvIL RIGHTS ACT
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to overrule Mar-
tin v. Wilks insofar as employment discrimination is con-
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cerned. 11' The Act attempts this through a carefully integrated
statutory amendment 1 2 designed to preserve and encourage de-
crees while at the same time ensuring that those affected by de-
crees have an adequate opportunity to protect their interests.1
Section 703 of Title VII as amended by the new statute provides
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law.... an employment prac-
tice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent
judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination
under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be chal-
lenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).'
14
The circumstances requisite for immunizing the decree from
challenge are specified in subparagraph (B):
"I Congress shunned a sweeping response to Martin. Instead of adopting a
mandatory intervention rule for all federally litigated cases, Congress decided to insulate
only employment practices implemented under a litigated or consent judgment from
subsequent civil rights or constitutional claims. Given this piecemeal approach, Martin
will continue to govern all other cases. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 105-10.
12 The statute takes a far broader approach than earlier congressional efforts to
minimize the prospect of inconsistent suits. For example, normally Title VII accords a
right of private action to a victim of discrimination. But where the EEOC files suit on
the basis of a charge lodged by the victim, the-victim may not file a separate suit but is
limited to intervention in the government's action. See generally SULLIVAN, ZIMMER &
RICHARDS. supra note 12, § 30.8. Similarly, the Clean Air Act, which generally authorizes
"Citizen suits," 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 1992), provides that "No action may be com-
menced.., if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the
standard, limitation, or order, but in an such action in a court of the United States any
person may intervene as a matter of right." § 7604(b)(1)(B).
Of course, provisions such as this merely narrow, they do not eliminate, the possibil-
ity of inconsistent judgments. The basic thrust is to limit attacks by different plaintiffs;
neither enactment would prevent third parties who may be affected by the decree's re-
quirements of defendants from bringing an action.
" Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The new Act was preceded by the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990): H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990). See S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24-27 (1990).
In drafting the statute, Congress responded to the Supreme Court's observation that
Congress had the power to change the result of Martin by devising a specific remedial
scheme. The articulated purpose of the new statute was to steer a "middle course be-
tween Martin, which was considered overly expansive in permitting collateral challenges,
and the majority of lower court decisions that precluded all collateral attacks." H.R. REP.
No. 40, supra note 6, at 59-60.
11' Pub. L. No. 102-166, Sec. 108, § 703(n)(1)(A), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Section 108 is entitled "Facilitating Prompt and Orderly Resolu-




A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a
claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws-
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), had-
(1) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to
apprise such person that such judgment or order might ad-
versely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and
that an opportunity was available to present objections to such
judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judg-
ment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by an-
other person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on
the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless
there has been an intervening change in law or fact."'
The most obvious significance of this provision is that, to
the extent its requirements are satisfied, the employment prac-
tice is immunized from subsequent attack. Thus, regardless of
the validity of the underlying practice in the abstract, it will be
"legal" in the sense that it cannot be attacked either to change
the actual practice or to obtain damages.11 This immunity is the
most radical change from prior law. Martin, read most broadly,
left employment practices implementing consent or litigated de-
crees wholly subject to attack; even read most narrowly as we
suggest, Martin would still permit attacks that do not require a
direct conflict with the decree, as by awarding damages to per-
sons displaced by decreed remedies.
Second, the statute applies not only to federal judgments,
but also to state orders and judgments that resolve federal civil
",' § 703(n)(1)(B). This article does not address the retroactivity of the new statute.
One district court recently summarized the confused state of the law on this question as
follows:
No clear trend has emerged. Although the three courts of appeals to consider
the issue have ruled in favor of prospectively applying the 1991 Act, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit is not among them. See Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Service Company, 1992 WL 92511 (7th Cir. May 7, 1992);
Fray v. Omaha World Herald Company, 1992 WL 65663 (8th Cir. Apr. 3,
1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 1992 WL 45451 (6th Cir. Mar. 13, 1992).
District Courts are almost evenly divided.
Sanko v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, No. Civ. A87-2390, 1992 WL 110466 (W.D. Pa.
May 22, 1992).
I36 Should one of the parties to a consent decree seek to modify it, as to conform it
to changes in the law or to deal with unforeseen hardships, Rufo v. Inmate3 of Suffolk
County Jail, 112 S. CL 748 (1992), the resulting change may generate new problems con-
cerning the effectiveness of the decree in terms of this statute.
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rights and constitutional claims.11 Absent application of the
statute to state judgments, a glaring gap would be created in the
statute's protective shield. A growing number of federally based
employment claims are being brought in state court. Unless the
statute's provision were to apply to state judgments, state court
ordered affirmative action schemes would only be protected if
the states enacted statutes similar to the 1991 Act. Given the
statute's directive, even if the rendering state would not, under
its law, immunize the employment practice from attack, the
state judgment now protects the employment practice from chal-
lenge as a violation of the Constitution or federal civil rights law.
The statute thus modifies the general rule that federal courts
must give state judgments the same preclusive effect as the ren-
dering state would accord them.118
The immunity the statute provides is significant both retro-
spectively and prospectively. An employer, having entered a
qualifying decree, can rely on not being second-guessed by a
subsequent court. Perhaps even more important, parties consid-
ering a settlement via consent decree can be expected to struc-
ture their agreement to maximize the prospects of immunity.
In approaching the statute, two questions are important.
First, the scope or extent of the immunity created and, second,
the requirements for immunity to attach.
A. Scope of Immunity
The statute's grant of immunity is expressly limited. Under
its terms, a qualifying employment practice "may not be chal-
lenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights
laws."' 9 This raises several issues. First, any challenge that is
11 In this regard, the statute immunizes employment practices more broadly than
any change in the federal joinder and intervention rules could.
"0 There is little question that Congress has the power to give state judgments
resolving federal claims less preclusive effect than the rendering state would. See note 8
supra. But does Congress have the power to give the state judgment greater effect? If
one views the statute simply in preclusion terms, one may question the ability of Con-
gress to modify state preclusion rules. On the other hand, one can view the statute sub-
stantively, as legalizing an employment practice that might otherwise be a violation of
federal law. Apart from constitutional constraints, Congress has the power to shield em-
ployment practices under federal law.
119 § 703(n)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). A qualifying employment practice is one
that is in accordance with a "litigated or consent judgment or order" following an em-
ployment discrimination claim brought under the Constitution or federal civil laws.
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not predicated on a "federal civil rights law" or the Constitution
is not barred by this provision. For example, if a consent order
would require conduct contrary to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the practice could still be attacked.12 0 Presumably, such
federal claims would be treated under the Martin v. Wilks
analysis.
Second, the immunity does not reach judgments, whether
by state or federal court, resolving disputes on the basis of state
law. Any employment practice implemented solely in response
to state law claims may still be open to challenge under state
preclusion principles.1 2 1 Ironically, then, a defendant might in-
sist on a complaint being amended to add a federal civil rights
claim before agreeing to a consent order resolving it, or at least
having the consent order recite that it also resolves federally
based claims.
Third, the terms of this provision do not, expressly at least,
immunize the employment practice against suits based on state
law. If this language was chosen advisedly, Congress explicitly
decided to leave potential state claims unaffected by the immu-
nity created by the statute. Under such a view, there would be
no Supremacy Clause issue because Congress would have per-
mitted states to challenge practices mandated by federal
decrees.1
22
Such a view, however, would tend to eviscerate the whole
purpose of the new statute. Since most states have civil rights
laws tracking the federal statute, to allow state-based attacks on
employment practices mandated by federal decrees would effec-
tively deprive the vast majority of federal judgments of mean-
ingful immunizing effect. Accordingly, the drafters probably did
not intend to allow state-based claims against court ordered re-
structuring in the workplace: in confining the newly created im-
munity they probably simply overlooked potential state-based
claims.
§ 703(n)(1)(A).
.20 52 Stat. 106, 29 U.S.C. § 201. This law establishes minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements for covered employers. A decree that established compensation in vio-
lation of FLSA commands would not immunize the implementing practices.
121 The immunity created by a state judgment resolving state laws claims would
turn on the particular state's procedural law.
122 Cf. note 118 supra.
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B. Requirements for Immunity
1. Persons Barred From Challenging the Decree
What, then, is necessary for a decree to immunize an em-
ployment practice? Two kinds of "persons" are barred from
challenging such employment practices,12 3 a phrasing that sug-
gests that the ability of any subsequent plaintiff to attack an
underlying practice must be assessed individually. As a result,




The first category of persons barred are those who, before
entry of the judgment, had "actual notice" that the judgment or
order "might adversely affect [their] interests and legal rights"
and a reasonable opportunity to present objections.125 Actual no-
tice clearly means that constructive notice, as by newspaper ad-
vertisements or notice to unions, will not suffice. Thus, an em-
ployer cannot rely on such devices as posting notices in the
workplace. Nevertheless, should a potential plaintiff receive no-
tice, even informally or by word of mouth, that person will be
barred if the other requirements are satisfied.
1 2
An employer agreeing to a remedial scheme affecting only
identifiable employees could resort to the "actual notice" provi-
sion of the statute. The most effective and probably least expen-
sive method of notifying current employees would be to include
a notice along with employees' paychecks; retirees whose bene-
fits might be affected could receive notice in a similar manner.
In this way the employer could avoid factual disputes concern-
12' § 703(n)(1)(B)(i) & (ii).
124 Both the 1990 Civil Rights Bill vetoed by the President and the 1991 version as
reported by Committee and passed by the House on June 5, 1991, provided that the
decreed practice would also, in some cases, be immune from attack "(3) where the court
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide notice to interested persons."
H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 6, at 55. The analog to this "reasonable notice" provision
can be found in bankruptcy and probate practice which both foreclose subsequent claims
by persons for whom reasonable efforts were made to notify before entry of judgment.
Id. at 57-58
125 § 703(n)(1)(B)(i). Contrary to Martin directive, Congress placed the onus on the
interested third party to decide whether to enter the litigation rather than require the
original parties to join potentially affected persons under Rule 19.
'26 H.RP REP. No. 40, supra note 6, at 51; id. at 20.
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ing the receipt of actual notice. 27
A remedial scheme affecting unidentifiable persons could
not be sheltered by this provision. For example, the employer in
Martin who agreed to a remedial hiring plan would be unable to
actually notify all potential applicants. While a conspicuous no-
tice in the newspapers might give actual notice to some ad-
versely affected persons, the statute apparently contemplates
notice to each and every person who might claim the hiring
practice to be unlawful.1 2 Thus, the insistence on actual notice,
which is more than constitutionally required, may very well limit
the remedial options available to A and B.2 9
In this regard, the 1991 Act is significantly different from
the 1990 version vetoed by the President. That proposal immu-
nized the ordered employment practices if it were determined
that reasonable efforts had been made to notify interested per-
sons prior to entry of the order. 30 Although this category of pre-
cluded persons was included in an earlier version of the 1991
bill,131 Congress ultimately decided to give less sweeping protec-
tion to employment practices implementing litigated and con-
sent judgments.
32
I27 Certain commentators have suggested that it is not actual notice that satisfies
due process but rather a sufficient system for giving notice. See Strickler, supra note 4,
at 1579 n.99. While it is true that an adequate system for providing notice will suffice,
even if particular individuals do not get actual notice, it is hard to see how a person who
received actual notice could claim a denial of due process even if the system for provid-
ing notice were somehow deficient. EEOC v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d
1499, 1508 (9th Cir.) (actual notice of pending ADEA action sufficient), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 55 (1990). Kramer, supra note 2, at 347. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. %. Szuk-
hent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
128 The notice provision ultimately enacted is inconsistent with relevant portions of
the legislative history. The House report, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), states that notice is to be given to "reasonably ascertaina-
ble" interested parties. HR. RaP. No. 40, supra note 6, at 594-96.
'19 For example, a remedial promotion scheme may be immunized by giving actual
notice to all current employees. An affirmative action hiring scheme, however, would be
virtually impossible to immunize under the first category of the statute. But see Is-
sacharoff, supra note 13, at 238 (since applicants do not have a protectable interest,
entry-level affirmative action plans pose no problem under Martin). As to whether it
could be immunized under the second category, § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii); see notes 139-43 and
accompanying text infra. Also, the statute does not address the case management issues
that will undoubtedly arise once actual notice is given to all potentially affected persons.
10 H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1) (1990).
131 See 137 CONG. REc. H3879 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (reporting out H.R. 1 by the
House Committee on Education and Labor).
In The President's Civil Rights bill would have left Martin untouched. As intro-
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Finally, the statute does not specify what should be in-
cluded in the notice. Clearly, the notice should set forth the pro-
posed order, explain the impact the order may have on the per-
sons affected, notify the nonparties of their right to object to the
proposal, and that failure to object will bar future challenges to
the proposed scheme.
133
b. Persons Adequately Represented
Second, "a person whose interests were adequately repre-
sented by another person who had previously challenged the
judgment" is also barred from suit. This second category does
not require actual notice to each person potentially affected by
the decree. 34 But while the notice burden is less, the level of
protection is also reduced. The affected nonparties are barred
from attacking the employment practice only if they were ade-
duced by Senator Michel, the President's version provided:
Sec. 5. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS
For purposes of determining whether a litigated or consent judgment or
order resolving a claim of employment discrimination because of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or disability shall bind only those individuals who
were parties to the judgment or order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
shall apply in the same manner as they apply with respect to other civil causes
of action.
H.R. 1375, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. H3897 (daily ed.
June 4, 1991). The Administration's version submitted in the Senate was virtually identi-
cal. S. 611, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S3022-23 (Mar. 12,
1991). As stated in note 128 supra, the House version would have extended the immu-
nity very broadly. The Danforth-Kennedy version passed on October 30, 1991, was a
compromise which severely limits the proposed statute's effectiveness by making the im-
munity more difficult to achieve.
"' The notice used in Martin, see note 22 supra, would be too vague to satisfy the
statute.
M Assuming true adequacy of representation, there would seem to be no constitu-
tional objection to the second criterion of the Act. See Strickler, supra note 4, at 1575
n.84. In addition to citing the class action example, Professor Strickler notes that: "Pre-
clusion has been extended to nonparties who have had control over the actions of par-
ties." Id. (citing Note, Collateral estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. R.v. 1485, 1497-98
(1974); Nina Cortell, Comment. The Expanding Scope of the Res Judicata Bar, 54 Tax.
L. REv. 527, 529-33 (1976)). He also notes the doctrine of "virtual representation," that
is, where an absentee's interests are closely aligned to those of a party. Id. (citing Allan
D. Vestal, Res JudicataPreclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. R.v. 357 (1974); Louis
Touton, Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1551, 1557-62 (1979)). See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger




quately represented by a party to the litigation."3 5 Even then,
there are limitations on the extent of the bar.130
Consider the case where the employer B vigorously litigates
a case brought by A. Should A prevail, C would presumably be
barred from suit on all issues actually litigated. Where a consent
decree exists, however, B's interest dramatically diverges from
C's. While B could theoretically continue to advance C's inter-
ests (either out of conviction or for fear of the consequences of
liability to C of not doing so), it is no longer clear that B is an
adequate representative.1 3 7 Indeed, determining this might well
require a proceeding that would rival a trial itself. Perhaps the
appropriate rule is simply to presume no adequacy of represen-
tation where there is a showing of diverse interests.
A closer case may arise where A sues not only the employer,
B 1 but also the union, B 2- While the employer's interests may
diverge from those of C, a white employee who is also a member
of the union may be adequately represented by the union.lrs If
so, any judgment is binding on all the union members and possi-
bly on non-union employees.
In any event, the nonparty is barred from relitigating only
those issues litigated by the representative. The effect is thus
one of issue, not claim, preclusion. This appears to be the inten-
tion of the provision barring suit where the prior litigation was
conducted "on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual
situation."139 Suppose women sue an employer for pregnancy
discrimination and the employer defends vigorously, claiming
that it did not discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. The re-
I" § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii). The concept of "adequate representation" appears at least
twice in the Federal Rules. It is a requirement for certain class actions, FED. R. Civ. P.
23., and the lack of adequate representation is a criterion for intervention of right, under
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See, e.g., Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
See also Vreeland, supra note 49.
"' See note 115 supra (text of provision); notes 139-43 and accompanying text
infra.
137 See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 971 (1982).
138 Compare English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972)
(union could not adequately represent the interests of both black and white members)
with Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969) (union could seek
to correct injustices to a substantial minority of its members). Cf. Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n v. Young, 824 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1987); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n,




suiting decree provides seniority relief to the successful plain-
tiffs, jumping them over male workers. The males then sue the
employer, claiming discrimination in the "constructive senior-
ity" for women. The issue of discrimination vel non has been
litigated and cannot be relitigated. Could the males, however,
claim that the discrimination was a bona fide occupational quali-
fication (bfoq), an issue not raised by the employer? Of course,
the male plaintiffs might also claim that the employer's failure
to raise the bfoq defense in the earlier suit was evidence that the
employer was not an adequate representative. In fact, the ade-
quacy of representation may tend to merge with the question of
what issues, factual or legal, are raised. 40
Even when the common issue requirement is satisfied, there
is an exception where "there has been an intervening change in
law or fact."'' An example of a change in the law might be the
Supreme Court's tightening scrutiny of affirmative action plans
of public employers. 142 Presumably, an employer's resistance to
a court order under more permissive standards would not, even
assuming the employer was an adequate representative, bar a
white worker from challenging an affirmative action plan after
the law changed.
43
More difficult than the change of law notion is the exception
for an "intervening change in . . .fact." This is especially per-
plexing given that the only time the immunity applies is when
there is a "similar factual situation." The statute seems to sug-
gest that C will not be barred when the facts have changed al-
though the factual situation is similar. Perhaps Congress meant
the rule to apply to the general facts in litigation, and the excep-
tion to apply when (although the general facts may stay the
same) the facts relating to the particular plaintiff C are differ-
ent. For example, suppose that the A-B suit results in giving A
1I An exception to this is where the employer intentionally foregoes an issue for
strategic reasons only. This might make the employer an adequate representative, oven
though C would not be barred from suing on the issues not raised by the employer.
z § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii). These requirements are much more limiting than was true
under the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990. Under that bill, there was no limitation to
issue preclusion, nor was there any provision for intervening change in law or fact. See
H.R. 4000, S. 2104 supra note 130.
142 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
143 It is not clear whether this is a meaningful provision since, under normal preclu-
sion principles, a change in the law is a factor cutting against preclusion. At the least,
however, the statute codifies that principle for cases within it.
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remedial seniority, thereby moving C down relative to A. If it
appeared that the effect of this change at the time it was made
would be only to defer C's promotion, it might be fair to immu-
nize the decree; if, however, changing economic conditions later
put C's very job at risk, perhaps B's immunity should be limited.
c. Implementing the Opportunity to be Heard
Those who have actual notice of the "proposed judgment or
order" will be barred only if they had "a reasonable opportunity
to present objections." 4' Of course, this provision makes sense
with respect to a consent decree that, once it is agreed to be-
tween the parties, can be promulgated to affected persons before
being actually entered by the court."45 However, what this means
for litigated decrees is uncertain: the judgment will not be en-
tered until after trial, and at that point it is too late to allow
nonparties to participate. Did Congress mean to include persons
who had actual notice of the possibility of such a judgment, as
by notice of a trial placing their interests at issue? If the phras-
ing of the statute is relied upon, notice must be "of the proposed
judgment," not merely of the litigation or the possibility of an
adverse judgment. Further, given the multiplicity of possible
remedies even when discrimination is established, it does not
follow that an individual who knows of the litigation, and even
knows of the relief sought in the complaint, will have notice of
the "proposed judgment" that eventuates. Finally, it is not clear
what the legal system should do with respect to a fully tried case
in which a person adversely affected seeks to derail an otherwise
valid judgment.
As a practical matter, it may be that practices under liti-
gated judgments will be immunized only if C's interests were ad-
equately represented, while consent decrees will be immunized if
there was adequate representation or if there was notice and a
reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Turning to the latter, the statute contemplates immunizing
a practice from attack by C if C, in addition to actual notice,
had an "opportunity ... to present objections to such judg-
14 § 703(n)(1)(B)(i)(I)&(ID.
"' In fact, in the antitrust area, there is a specific statutory provision for notice and
comment before the entry of a consent decree. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1988).
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ment."'" This suggests that C's opportunity for a full trial, or
even an evidentiary hearing, is not critical to B's immunity. The
implication is that the kind of fairness hearing held in the Mar-
tin litigation, although not an evidentiary hearing, would suffice.
However, this does not necessarily mean that C can be de-
prived of a full trial. The necessity for full participation depends
on constitutional issues of due process. The new amendment
does provide that it shall not be construed to "authorize or per-
mit the denial to any person of the due process of law required
by the Constitution. 1 47 This last provision makes explicit what
is implicit in the rest of the statute. While Martin was phrased
in terms of a construction of the Federal Rules, there are clearly
constitutional questions about subjecting individuals to decrees
in actions to which they are not parties. The obvious theory of
the Congress was that due process concerns are satisfied by ei-
ther (1) notice and opportunity to be heard or (2) adequate rep-
resentation by a party to the action. The former principle is, of
course, the core due process requirement, 148 while the latter is
the constitutional basis of class action law.
149
At this level of generality, there can be no question about
due process. Rather, the real questions will arise when the courts
determine what constitutes actual notice and an opportunity to
be heard. It is here that the statute's caution about due process
may be helpful.1 50 One reading of the statute is that the fairness
hearing provided in Martin will be sufficient to bar C from at-
tacking the employment practice: interested nonparties should
not be allowed to intervene if their application is untimely or if
they fail to meet the other standards for intervention. On the
other hand, the interests of the nonparties may be so significant
that nothing short of full participation in the litigation will sat-
isfy the statute's requirement that nonparties be given an oppor-
tunity to be heard.
Although subparagraph (B)(i) is phrased in terms of a "rea-
sonable opportunity to present objections" to the court, the rea-
sonableness of the opportunity must be assessed in terms of the
146 § 703(n)(1)(B)(i)(II) (emphasis added).
147 § 703(n)(2)(D).
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1' See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
§ 703 (n)(2)(A), (D).
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interests to be protected. 5 ' Some interests would seem to justify
full participation. An example may make this clear. Suppose fe-
male plaintiffs and the employer agree that the employer has
violated Title VII in its promotions. The agreed remedy is to
give all current female employees a ten-point preference on the
employer's rating system in future promotion decisions. Such a
gender preference would undoubtedly violate Title VII were it
not a remedy for past discrimination. Even as a remedy for
proven discrimination, it may well go too far in favoring all
women, even though probably not all of them were disadvan-
taged by prior promotion decisions. Simply offering male work-
ers an opportunity to air their objections would not seem to sat-
isfy due process-the appropriateness of the decree turns on
disputed questions of fact and law: was there prior discrimina-
tion against females and, if so, how pervasive was it? Presuma-
bly, due process would accord the males the right to prove that
the predicates of the decree are incorrect, at least if they could
make a prima facie showing to that effect.
15 2
Assuming that due process requires an opportunity for full
participation in order to be bound, the statute's immunity provi-
sion may be in tension with Rule 24.113 On the one hand, the
statute itself purports not to affect Rule 24; the statute provides
that it shall not be construed to "alter the standards for inter-
5" The drafters recognized that a case-by-case analysis would have to be made in
accord with Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (due process necessitates
"an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for [a]
hearing appropriate to the case"). See H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 6, at 56; Mark E.
Recktenwald, Comment, Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent
Decrees, 53 U. CHL L REV. 147, 181 n.139 (1986) (few courts have approved use of fair-
ness hearings to dispose of nonminority claims).
"I A contrary argument might be that due process is not implicated by the immu-
nity scheme Congress created. By granting immunity from causes of action it created in
the first place, Congress does not violate due process. The only question is whether Con-
gress can limit the rights of potential Title VII plaintiffs by creating an immunity to
what would otherwise be legitimate Title VII claims. Suppose Congress had barred dis-
crimination only against minorities and women, not making discrimination against white
males actionable. This would raise no due process questions, and would also be valid
under the Equal Protection Clause. The immunity scheme created by the 1991 statute is
less sweeping than that, and therefore would also be permissible.
"I Under Rule 24, a nonparty must show that it has such an interest in the subject
matter of the litigation, that the disposition of the litigation without its participation will
impair or impede its ability to protect its interest, that the named parties do not ade-
quately protect its interest, and that the application for intervention is timely. See, e.g.,
Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1989).
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vention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened
pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties in-
tervened." On the other hand, Rule 24 will not always insure
that C can intervene in a manner sufficient to protect its inter-
ests. For example, before Martin, the timeliness requirement of
Rule 24 posed a serious obstacle to intervention, and the consid-
erations leading to this result have not changed. Factors the
court considers in determining whether intervention is timely in-
clude: the point to which the litigation has progressed; the pur-
pose of the intervention; the extent to which the delay in seek-
ing intervention is excusable; and the prejudice to the original
parties caused by the intervenor's delay in seeking interven-
tion.15 4 In balancing these factors, many courts, including the
district court in Martin, denied intervention. 155 This was partic-
ularly true if intervention were sought at the remedial stage. In
the interest of judicial economy and the named parties, courts
understandably were reluctant to permit intervention at such
late stages of litigation."5
Notwithstanding the statute's directive on rule 24, the im-
munity provision may require a rethinking of the timeliness rule.
Since Martin informs us that C can commence a separate suit
against B to challenge the remedial scheme agreed to in prior
litigation, the denial of intervention on timeliness grounds will
not often be justified. Simply stated, the goal of judicial econ-
omy will not be served. Martin itself illustrates the problem.
Having been denied intervention as untimely, other white
firefighters just shifted the dispute to another forum. Accord-
ingly, some courts in the post-Martin era recognized that strict
application of the timeliness requirement was counterproductive
and that practical considerations pointed to intervention as
preferable to consecutive actions. 157 Nevertheless, in extreme sit-
IN See, e.g., Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1980); Hefner v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 605 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 955 (1980).
See note 23 supra.
The timeliness requirement put the Cs of the world in a Catch-22 position. If
they sought intervention at an early stage of litigation, their motion might be denied as
premature since the harm to their interest was not apparent. Yet, if they waited until the
remedial stage, their motion might be deemed untimely.
157 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1989) (even
though independent second action was permissible post-Martin, practical considerations
pointed to intervention as a preferred procedural device). But see Dixon v. Margolis, No.
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uations, some applications for intervention will continue to be
untimely, raising the question of whether the statutory immu-
nity is thereby unavailable because C did not have a reasonable
opportunity to participate fully.
In short, to give full effect to the immunity envisioned by
the statute, the courts may have to reinterpret the requirement
of timeliness for intervention. Failing to do that may prevent the
immunity from attaching because there was not a "reasonable
opportunity" for C to protect its interests adequately.
d. Miscellaneous Provisions
Finally, another provision of new section 703(n) specifies
that it shall not be construed to "apply to the rights of parties to
the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was
entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be
represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose
behalf relief was sought in such action by the Federal Govern-
ment."158 This "savings clause" seems designed to ensure that
the rules governing litigation on behalf of plaintiffs continue un-
affected. The first part of the provision, dealing with class ac-
tions, seems unobjectionable: the validity of the judgment in a
class action vis-h-vis class members turns, inter alia, on the ade-
quacy of representation of the class, therefore the new statute
would not seem to change the law in any event.101 As for federal
government actions on behalf of individuals, Title VII elsewhere
provides mechanisms for protecting individual rights in such ac-
tions.160 Thus, this provision seems enacted out of a surplus of
caution.
Further, the statute preserves traditional exceptions to the
effect of judgments by providing that new section 703(n) shall
not be construed to "prevent challenges to a litigated or consent
judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order
was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently in-
valid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction."1 61
89-C-5019, 1992 WL 80512 (N.D. Ill. April 14, 1992).
' § 703(n)(2)(B).
= FED. P, Crv. P. 23(i)(3).




Finally, the statute provides that, should a challenge be
mounted to a decree, it is normally to be raised before the court
that entered the decree:
Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an
employment consent judgment or order described in paragraph (1)
shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that
entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall pre-
clude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28,
United States Code.
62
Presumably, this provision will allow all interested parties, (A, B
and C) to resolve their disputes before the district court judge
most familiar with the underlying litigation.
One noticeable omission from the statute is any reference to
Rule 19. Congress intended to steer a middle course between
Martin v. Wilks's Rule 19 joinder requirement-that all ad-
versely affected persons must be joined to insulate an employ-
ment practice-and the collateral bar rule that had been
adopted by a majority of the circuit courts. Presumably persons
who fall into either of the statute's categories of persons barred
from challenging the decreed employment practice need not be
joined under Rule 19. Otherwise section 108 would be of no im-
port and Martin v. Wilks would be left entirely intact. For the
sake of clarity Congress should have made reference to Rule 19.
Still one should interpret the statute as a direct response to the
Supreme Court's preference for mandatory Rule 19 joinder. If
the statute's immunity provisions are satisfied, the parties need
not be concerned with joining the nonparties under Rule 19.
CONCLUSION
The provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 designed to
overrule Martin v. Wilks is very limited in its application: it
protects only employment practices implemented by a litigated
or consent judgment resolving federal civil rights disputes from
subsequent federal civil rights and constitutional claims. Outside
this prescribed area the principles of Martin still apply. Even
for those claims within its ambit, the new law is likely to have
considerably less effect than its sponsors may have anticipated.




the immunity of a decree are so stringent as not to offer flexibil-
ity in shaping remedial schemes, whether worked by the parties
through a consent decree or the courts in structuring judgments
after litigation. Presumably, where the requirements of the stat-
ute are not met, Martin still controls. In short, even in the em-
ployment area, Martin v. Wilks remains alive and well, if not
quite as hale and hearty as when it was originally handed down
in 1989.
Nevertheless, this conclusion is not as depressing for the
proponents of civil rights as one might suppose. Martin, prop-
erly read, is not such a blow to decrees as was initially thought.
Once a decree has been entered, and despite the tenor of the
majority's opinion, courts should try to accommodate the decree
when resolving subsequent suits. This can always be done where
the interests of the plaintiffs in the subsequent suit can be fully
satisfied by monetary remedies. Where that is not true, and the
two interests are irreconcilable, it still does not follow that the
prior judgment cannot be respected. Just as in the case of con-
flicting contract claims to real property, an earlier decree may be
held to limit the remedies otherwise available to a subsequent
plaintiff.
Since respect for the prior decree is still possible post-Mar-
tin, the real problem with that decision has less to do with the
finality of judgments than it does with the effect on the parties'
willingness to settle. Because a decree does not protect the em-
ployer from multiple liability, or at least multiple litigation, em-
ployers will be less likely to settle suits, or at least will try to in
ways that limit their risks to third parties. Short of a statutory
amendment that broadens the classes of persons barred from at-
tacking decreed employment practices, consent decrees will not
accord the immunity the drafters may have hoped.
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